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REDISTRICTING TRANSPARENCY
REBECCA GREEN*
ABSTRACT
Until recently, legislative redistricting remained a relatively ob-
scure topic for most Americans. In the upcoming 2020 round, in-
creased public interest in the problem of gerrymandering, combined
with the rise of technologies that empower public participation, will
fuel public scrutiny of state redistricting processes at levels never
before experienced. Are states prepared for this oversight onslaught?
Will current redistricting transparency rules frustrate or nurture
growing public interest? Can states take steps in advance of 2020 to
ensure meaningful and productive public participation during the
redistricting process? A thoughtful approach to redistricting trans-
parency can both improve resulting maps and stave off litigation.
This Article surveys the landscape of current state redistricting
transparency rules, discusses technological innovations that impact
redistricting transparency, asks whether redistricting transparency
is an unqualified good, and suggests a set of redistricting transpar-
ency decision points states should consider heading into the 2020
round.
* Co-Director, Election Law Program, and Professor of Practice of Law, William & Mary
Law School. The author would like to thank Carrie Mattingly, William & Mary Law School
Class of 2017, Caiti Anderson, Class of 2018, Jakob Stalnaker, Class of 2019, Anna McMullen,
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INTRODUCTION
For much of this country’s history, the redistricting process—like
so many other government processes—took place in proverbial (if
not literal) smoke-filled rooms.1 If legislative redistricting happened
at all (which, for decades it did not, despite state constitutional
commands),2 the process included very little, if any, public oversight
or input.3 Practical realities prevented meaningful oversight. Few
Americans were aware the process took place and lacked the rari-
fied legal and technical expertise to understand redistricting’s sub-
tleties and evaluate legislative maps.4
In the 1950s and 1960s, public attention to inequities in redis-
tricting, specifically malapportionment between rural and urban
districts, gave rise to heightened public awareness of the issue gen-
erally.5 Equipopulation concerns culminated in the Supreme Court’s
“one person, one vote” mandate in 1962, requiring that states re-
draw congressional and state legislative districts every ten years to
account for changes in population.6 According to public opinion
polling at the time, the vast majority of members of the public (76
percent) agreed with the “one person, one vote” principle.7 If the
1. See Harlan Yu & David G. Robinson, The New Ambiguity of “Open Government,” 59
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 178, 184 (2012) (noting that “prior to World War II [which upon its
conclusion heralded open-government reforms], the key federal law controlling disclosure of
government information was the archaic Housekeeping Statute of 1789, which gave ‘[g]overn-
ment officials general authority to operate their agencies’ and withhold records from the
public.” (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at
2-3 (1966))); cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-12 (1991) (discussing
the historical U.S. constitutional tension between transparency and needed secrecy).
2. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191 (1962) (noting that for sixty years, between 1901 and
1961, Tennessee failed to reapportion). 
3. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS SMITH, ON DEMOCRACY’S DOORSTEP: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW
THE SUPREME COURT BROUGHT “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE” TO THE UNITED STATES 23-24 (2014)
(describing heightened public awareness of malapportionment between rural and urban dis-
tricts in California).
6. BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 53 (2015).
7. Joshua Fougere et al., Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting, 9 ELECTION
L.J. 325, 325 & n.1 (2010) (noting that after the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr, 76
percent of Americans called the so-called “one person, one vote” decision “right,” citing a Louis
Harris & Associates survey from 1966).
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public conceptually absorbed and approved of the idea of “one
person, one vote,” intermittent polling thereafter established that
the vagaries of the rest of the redistricting process remained largely
removed from public consciousness.8
In the decades that followed Baker v. Carr, states dutifully
completed the decennial redistrict.9 But public participation and
oversight of the process remained minimal.10 State legislatures
largely shrouded the redistricting process from public view and built
in few public input mechanisms.11 Cloaked processes and mounting
fairness concerns later prompted reform efforts, particularly in
states with direct democracy mechanisms.12 In several states, re-
formers created independent redistricting commissions featuring a
variety of transparency measures to make the process more open,
participatory, and accountable.13
In the 2010 round of redistricting, many states saw an unprece-
dented level of public participation buoyed by a technological revolu-
tion in the way the public could engage in the process.14 In the last
round, any person with access to a computer, redistricting software,
and basic knowledge of the line-drawing process could draw his or
her own maps in several states using the same data legislative line-
drawers used.15
This Article posits that these trends will be joined in 2020 by
another more recent phenomenon: unprecedented levels of public
interest in redistricting. Since the 2016 election and subsequent
8. See id. at 325 (“Beyond the easy-to-grasp concept of ‘one person, one vote’... the public
has little knowledge or opinion concerning the redistricting process.”).
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. In the 2010 round, several states hosted redistricting competitions that allowed
student teams to draw alternative maps. See Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters
More Accountable to the People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37,
58 (2010) (describing the Ohio Citizen Redistricting Competition); Christopher R. Nolen & Jeff
Palmore, Election Law and Government Ethics, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 119, 140 (2011) (describing
how State Senator John Miller introduced the winning William & Mary Law School team’s
map from the 2011 Virginia Redistricting Competition in the state senate as one of three
alternate plans); Noah Litton, Note, The Road to Better Redistricting: Empirical Analysis and
State-Based Reforms to Counter Partisan Gerrymandering, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 874 (2012)
(describing a public redistricting competition proposal); see also infra Part I.C.
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high-profile partisan gerrymandering cases in Wisconsin, Mary-
land, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, public interest in the re-
districting process is expanding.16 The experience of the Virginia
redistricting reform organization OneVirginia2021 is illustrative.
The group formed in 2013 to press for reform amid public outcry
following the 2010 round (which installed incumbent-protective
maps resulting in only two seats changing party hands in the sub-
sequent election).17 In the following several years, the organization’s
leadership struggled to gain traction. In January 2015, the group
had 3500 supporters.18 The fallout from the 2016 election, the Su-
preme Court’s invalidation of Virginia’s state legislative maps as
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in 2017,19 and unprecedented
local, state, and national attention to the issue of gerrymandering
(as well as the group’s own successful efforts to strike a chord), all
combined to swell OneVirginia’s ranks to 73,000 active members as
of March 2018.20 Polling in Virginia bears this trend out, showing
16. Energy and enthusiasm for redistricting reform has increased since the last round.
See, e.g., Eric Petry, Redistricting Reform Gains Momentum in 2016, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/print/14982 [https://perma.cc/66Y5-5XX3]
(noting that significant efforts for redistricting reform had been launched in ten separate
states, “the most in recent memory”); Bill White, Gerrymandering Reform Gaining Grassroots
Momentum, MORNING CALL (Feb. 1, 2017, 7:37 PM), http://www.mcall.com/opinion/white/
mc-bw-gerrymandering-20170201-story.html [https://perma.cc/RCY3-ZTFC] (describing huge
crowds at recent redistricting events in Pennsylvania).
17. Redistricting, ONEVIRGINIA2021, https://www.onevirginia2021.org/redistricting [https:
//perma.cc/72JS-VVGJ].
18. ONEVIRGINIA2021, VOTING’S NOT ENOUGH: DEMAND REDISTRICTING REFORM 1, http://
networknova.domain.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/OneVirginia2021-Packet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J48H-QLLH].
19. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794-95 (2017). This decision
came on the heels of a federal court holding Virginia’s U.S. congressional maps were
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. See Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 58 F. Supp. 3d
533 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Cantor v. Personhuballah, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015).
20. Monica Marciano, Redistricting Reform: Gerrymandering Should Be ‘Ethical Issue of
the Day,’ RAPPNEWS (July 24, 2017), http://rappnews.com/2017/07/24/redistricting-reform-
gerrymandering-should-be-ethical-issue-of-the-day [https://perma.cc/JXM2-ZEVM]. Although
it should be taken with a grain of salt, a Google Trends analysis confirms a rise in interest in
the topic generally. Google Trends does not reveal exact numbers for term searches, but it
does show the percentage growth in the number of searches. Simon Rogers, What Is Google
Trends Data—and What Does It Mean?, MEDIUM (July 1, 2016), https://medium.com/google-
news-lab/what-is-google-trends-data-and-what-does-it-mean-b48f07342ee8 [https://perma.
cc/T28A-TMRZ]. This growth (or decline) can indicate whether people have become more or
less interested in a topic over time. See id. Although interest in the term “redistricting” has
remained largely even since 2004 (when Google started recording searches), searches for the
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an increase in interest in redistricting, particularly among younger
voters. According to a Christopher Newport University Wason Cen-
ter for Public Policy survey, in 2015, 33 percent of Virginia voters
ages eighteen to forty-four indicated familiarity with redistricting
concepts.21 Polling in 2017 suggests that percentage has almost
doubled to 64 percent.22
As of this writing, it appears likely that public interest in the
process in the 2020 round could rise to levels states have not pre-
viously experienced.
Are states prepared for a potential onslaught of interest? What
measures can states take to ensure that public participation and
oversight mechanisms are functioning and adequate? Are states
preparing for negative consequences of increased public scrutiny?
Public channels of input can distort rather than enhance the pro-
cess, particularly given our current landscape of purposeful mis-
information campaigns and security lapses. Furthermore, massive
public interest can flood the process, making it difficult for line-
drawers to deliberate effectively, let alone absorb and incorporate
public will. In this environment, ensuring public satisfaction with
redistricting outcomes presents an enormous challenge for 2020
line-drawers.
This Article examines whether current state redistricting trans-
parency rules are adequate and suggests ways in which states might
term “gerrymandering” have spiked considerably. GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/
trends/explore?date=today%205-y&q=gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/N79K-SCV2]. In
November 2016, the number of people searching the term “gerrymandering” reached an all-
time high—much higher than any general election year on record. See id. As of November
2017, the total number of searches has more than doubled since November 2012, and has
more than quadrupled when compared to both November 2008 and November 2004. See id.
21. JUDY FORD WASON CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT U., VIRGINIANS
THINK MCDONNELL PRISON SENTENCE FAIR; BACK GIFT BAN, REDISTRICTING REFORM, RE-
PORTING CAMPUS RAPE TO POLICE, LOOSER MARIJUANA LAWS 8 (Jan. 27, 2015), http://wason
center.cnu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/1-27-15-General-Assembly.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6QV9-XHDV].
22. The Wason Center for Public Policy conducted the survey using registered Virginia
voters from February 2015, February 2016, and February 2017. JUDY FORD WASON CTR. FOR
PUB. POLICY, CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT U., GILLESPIE, NORTHAM LEAD PARTY RACES FOR GOVER-
NOR; VOTERS BACK ACA REPEAL, POT REFORM, BATHROOM BILL 15 (Feb. 2, 2017), http://wason
center.cnu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2-2-17-General-Assembly.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y82G-ZW4D].
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improve redistricting transparency mechanisms. The Article pro-
ceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an overview of state redistrict-
ing transparency rules and innovative approaches to transparency
in redistricting. Part II describes the risks inherent in transparent
processes, suggesting that redistricting is particularly vulnerable to
challenges transparency poses. Part III concludes with a set of
decision points to help ensure that increased public interest in the
redistricting process translates to meaningful public input and over-
sight—and public buy-in once the process is complete.
I. STATE MODELS FOR TRANSPARENCY IN REDISTRICTING
This Part surveys current state redistricting transparency envi-
ronments in three categories: transparency rules in states in which
legislators draw the lines; transparency rules governing independ-
ent redistricting commissions; and finally, a sampling of experi-
ments with redistricting transparency innovation.
A. Redistricting Transparency Provisions in Noncommission
States
As of this writing, thirteen states will employ some form of in-
dependent commission to draw state legislative lines in 2020.23 In
seven states, independent commissions will draw lines for U.S.
congressional districts.24 In the remaining thirty-seven states, leg-
islators will draw the lines of their own districts, and forty-three
state legislatures will draw U.S. congressional maps.25 Most state
23. See Redistricting Commissions: State Legislative Plans, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.
aspx [https://perma.cc/7TTS-TRRM].
24. See Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, NAT ’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-commissions-
congressional-plans.aspx [https://perma.cc/E5LQ-R25N].
25. Iowa has a unique redistricting process: nonpartisan legislative staffers at the Iowa
Legislative Services agency develop maps for Iowa’s legislative and U.S. congressional lines
without employing political or election data (including addresses of incumbents). NAT ’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 23. The legislature then votes on the plans developed. Id. An
Iowa statute requires that the Iowa legislative services agency make copies of bills and maps
it produces available to the public. IOWA CODE § 42.2(4) (2018). Iowa statutory law also es-
tablishes that a redistricting advisory commission shall conduct at least three public hearings
in different regions of the state after an initial plan is available. Id. § 42.6(3)(a). Further, the
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redistricting transparency provisions in noncommission states are
found in state statutes.26
Most state statutory approaches require some combination of
public meetings, notice, and publication of draft maps. Oregon’s
redistricting transparency statute, for example, requires its legis-
lature to hold ten public hearings throughout the state prior to pro-
posing a reapportionment plan.27 Following the proposal of a plan,
but before adoption, the legislature must, to the extent practicable,
hold five more public meetings in each congressional district or via
teleconference to permit active citizen participation throughout the
state.28 In addition, the statute requires appropriate public notice
commission is also responsible for submitting to the General Assembly a report summarizing
the information and testimony received during the hearings. Id. § 42.6(3)(b).
26. Of noncommission states, only a few state constitutions mention redistricting trans-
parency. Maine’s constitution provides that its advisory commission “shall hold public
hearings on any plan for apportionment prior to submitting such plan to the Legislature.” ME.
CONST. art. IV, pt. III, § 1-A. Maine’s commission functions in an advisory role with legisla-
tors exercising the final say. See Justin Levitt, Maine, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://
redistricting.lls.edu/states-ME.php [https://perma.cc/24PR-UZAK]. Thanks to a 1982 Michigan
Supreme Court case, Michigan’s constitutional transparency requirements are dead letter
law. See MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6. Michigan’s constitution contains a provision establishing
that a commission on legislative apportionment be responsible for redistricting. See id. The
Michigan constitution requires that such commission shall hold public hearings “as may be
provided by law.” Id. Michigan’s constitution mandates that any final plan be published before
it becomes law and delegates to its secretary of state the task of maintaining a public record
of all commission proceedings and publishing and distributing each plan. Id. Although these
constitutional provisions remain on the books, the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the
Michigan Constitution’s redistricting provisions in 1982 because of inconsistencies with the
equipopulation standard in Reynolds v. Sims. See In re Apportionment of State Legisla-
ture—1982, 321 N.W.2d 565, 582 (Mich. 1982) (per curiam) (“We have accordingly concluded
that the apportionment provisions of art. 4, §§ 2-6, cannot be maintained. When the weighted
land area/population apportionment formulae fell, all the apportionment rules fell because
they are inextricably related.”). Kansas’s state constitutional redistricting transparency does
not quite qualify as a transparency provision: it requires apportionment maps to be published,
but only following passage of new maps. KAN. CONST. art. 10, § 1(a) (requiring that legislative
districts be published in the Kansas register immediately following final passage). Plaintiffs
challenged Kansas’s lack of transparency in redistricting after the 1990 cycle. In In re
Stephan, plaintiffs argued that “there was no opportunity for public participation in the
drawing of the House districts ... [and] that the public hearings ... were not meaningful
because complete census figures were not available.” 836 P.2d 574, 578 (Kan. 1992) (per
curiam). The court responded: “Although a greater opportunity for comment on the proposed
Senate districts could have been provided the public as a matter of good government, the
failure to do so under the existing circumstances is not a deficiency that invalidates this
enactment on procedural grounds.” Id. at 579.
27. OR. REV. STAT. § 188.016(1) (2017).
28. Id. § 188.016(2).
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of each hearing be given; at least one of the preproposal hearings
be held in each congressional district; and, at least one preproposal
and one postproposal hearing be held in areas with the greatest pop-
ulation shifts since the previous reapportionment.29 Finally, people
in remote locations must be permitted to provide public testimony
at the hearings remotely through video equipment.30
In the past, even states with statutory transparency provisions
have run into trouble. Illinois provides an example. A 2011 statute
mandated that the Illinois legislature provide notice and hold public
hearings during its redistricting process.31 Despite these require-
ments, vocal criticism of the state’s transparency measures ensued.
Critics argued that the new law provided only a facade of transpar-
ency.32 As one journalist described it, “Democratic leaders in Illinois
held dozens of public hearings ... [, b]ut all of the meetings came
before the congressional redistricting maps were released, and the
Democratic majority quickly approved their own proposals with
little opportunity for the public, or Republicans, to voice concerns.”33
29. Id.
30. Id. § 188.016(3)(d). New York’s statute operates like Oregon’s, but applies only to its
redistricting commission, which suggests plans in an advisory capacity to its legislature. N.Y.
LEGIS. LAW §§ 93(1), 94(1) (McKinney 2017). New York’s commission must conduct at least
one public hearing on proposals in cities and counties throughout the state. Id. § 93(1)(f).
“Notice of all such hearings shall be widely published ... [within] a reasonable time before
every hearing.” Id. Further, the statute mandates that the commission publicize its draft
redistricting plans and relevant data in an accessible form, meaning “in a form that allows
... their use by the public to review, analyze, and comment upon ... plans and to develop
alternative redistricting plans for presentation to the commission at ... public hearings.” Id.
The commission is required to report all findings from the public hearings to the legislature.
Id. § 93(1). The statute is silent on transparency measures governing subsequent processes
the legislature undertakes to finalize the lines.
31. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/10-5 (2018). The Illinois Redistricting Transparency and Pub-
lic Participation Act requires that legislative redistricting committees conduct at least four
public hearings statewide to receive testimony and inform the public, and one hearing must
be held in each of four distinct geographic regions of the state. See id. All hearings must be
open to the public, and committee chairpersons must provide at least six days’ notice before
any hearing. Id.
32. See Redistricting Reform Facade, NORTHWEST HERALD (Dec. 12, 2010), http://www.
nwherald.com/2010/12/12/redistricting-reform-facade/atbxdap/ [https://perma.cc/DBR6-XUUT]
(“If you represented the status quo in Illinois—Democratic Party dominance over our broke,
crumbling state—and you wanted to project a façade of support for redistricting reform, what
would you do? You would propose the Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011 and the Redistricting
Transparency and Public Participation Act, that’s what.”). 
33. Nicholas Kusnetz, Redistricting: GOP and Dems Alike Have Cloaked the Process in
Secrecy, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 1, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://publicintegrity.org/2012/11/
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Illinois’s experience demonstrates that having transparency mea-
sures on the books does not necessarily translate to a satisfied
public.
Some state statutes employ permissive transparency rules or
rules that otherwise fall short of mandating transparency. For ex-
ample, an Alabama statute instructs that its committee on reappor-
tionment may hold public hearings.34 Likewise, a Vermont statute
permits that its legislative apportionment board (which proposes
maps for state legislative districts to the legislature) has the power
to hold public hearings.35 A North Carolina statute explicitly pro-
vides that all documents prepared for redistricting are not confiden-
tial and become public records—but only once the plan becomes law,
precluding meaningful public oversight or participation while plans
are being formulated.36
A slight majority of state constitutional and statutory regimes
(twenty-six) are silent on the topic of redistricting transparency.37
In the map below, the dark-shaded states are states that have no
01/11670/redistricting-gop-and-dems-alike-have-cloaked-process-secrecy [https://perma.cc/
5G3N-357B] (reporting, for example, that Ohio Republicans began a redistricting training for
legislators by advising them to “keep it secret”).
34. ALA. CODE § 29-2-52(g) (2017) (“The committee may meet within and without the
state, hold public hearings, and otherwise have all of the powers of a legislative committee
under the legislative law.” (emphasis added)).
35. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1908(2) (2017) (“The legislative apportionment board shall
have the following powers: ... (2) To hold public hearings in any town or city for the purpose
of obtaining information relevant to reapportionment of the general assembly.”). The board’s
final plans for representative districts must be made available for public inspection. Id.
§ 1906a(d). Vermont statutory law does provide for notice of municipal leaders when tentative
plans divide a town or city. Id. § 1905.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-133(a) (2017). Courts have not helped to open the process in
North Carolina. In Dickson v. Rucho, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that nothing
in section 120-133 can waive the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine in
redistricting litigation. 737 S.E.2d 362, 372 (2013). For a discussion of legislative privilege,
see infra Part I.B.
37. The following states do not explicitly address redistricting transparency in the state
constitution or statutes: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. It should be noted that
although these states lack constitutional or statutory commands specific to redistricting
transparency, most state constitutions make general reference to government openness, in-
cluding several states on this list. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(b); GA. CONST. art. III,
§ IV, para. XI; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 15; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 12;
WYO. CONST. art. III, § 14.
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explicit mention of redistricting transparency in their statutes or
constitutions.
The absence of transparency protections in state constitutions and
statutes has, in some cases, led to a largely closed process, as noto-
riously, for example, in Wisconsin.38 In the 2010 round, Wisconsin
Republicans controlled both houses of the legislature and the gover-
norship. Without meaningful opposition and with no rules to man-
date transparency, party leaders instead excluded the public (and
Democrats) from the process. Republican leaders hired a law firm
and instructed legislators who wanted to discuss the plan to sign a
confidentiality agreement.39 Republican leaders introduced the plan
on July 11, 2011, and held one public meeting two days later.40 On
38. Kentucky, North Carolina, and Wisconsin received a score of 0/100 on the metric of
whether the state held open meetings during the 2010 redistricting process from a Center for
Public Integrity analysis of redistricting transparency; Michigan, New Hampshire, North Da-
kota, Ohio, and Tennessee received a score of 25/100; and Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, and Wisconsin all received a score of 0/100 on the criteria of whether public hearings
were held seeking input on maps. Yue Qiu et al., How Does Your State Rank for Integrity?,
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 9, 2015, 12:17 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/
03/18822/how-does-your-state-rank-integrity [https://perma.cc/V962-CKRA].
39. Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F. Supp. 3d 918, 922 (W.D. Wis. 2015).
40. Id.
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July 19, the state senate approved the maps along a party-line
vote.41 The secretive approach undertaken by Wisconsin’s majority
party became part of the case against the maps that led a three-
judge federal court to strike the maps—the country’s first successful
partisan gerrymandering claim.42
That a state lacks explicit statutory redistricting transparency
commands does not mean that every legislature without statutory
mandates has followed Wisconsin’s approach. When a state’s stat-
utory scheme is silent on the question of redistricting transparency,
two mechanisms can provide a measure of transparency. The first
is legislative rules or practice. For example, Nevada’s constitution
and statutes contain no redistricting transparency protections. How-
ever, Nevada legislative rules during the 2010 round provided that
any person interested in presenting alternative plans or proposed
maps be provided a reasonable opportunity to do so.43 In addition,
Nevada legislative rules required that the state’s redistricting com-
mittee video record its meetings and hold them throughout the
state.44 Many states published maps and held public hearings dur-
ing the 2010 round via legislative rule or practice.45
Open records laws can be a second source to fill the transpar-
ency gap when a state’s constitution and statutes are silent. In most
noncommission states, legislative committees charged with redis-
41. Id.
42. The lack of transparency in the process was not by any means the only factor that
displeased the majority in Whitford, but the nature of Wisconsin’s secretive process fueled
considerably the narrative against the legislative majority’s actions. See id. Plaintiffs succes-
sfully proved this claim in part by introducing evidence that “[t]he plan was drafted in secret
and without any input from Democrats.” Id. at 928.
43. NEV. JOINT STANDING RULES, 76th Sess., R. 13.4 (2011).
44. Id. R. 13.6(4).
45. For example, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming
published redistricting maps in the 2010 round. See Justin Levitt, Maps and Data of the 2010
Redistricting Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/2010districts.php
[https://perma.cc/Z676-8SB7] (each redistricting map provided through “PDF” link in row cor-
responding to each respective state). All of those states, except for Kentucky and Oklahoma,
also held public meetings. Id. (information about public input and public meetings provided
through link to each state).
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tricting appear to be subject to the state’s open records46 and open
46. The following thirty-three states in which legislatures draw the lines each appear to
include the legislature and legislative committees within the ambit of the state’s public access
statute: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(7)(A) (2017); see, e.g., Laman v. McCord, 432
S.W.2d 753, 755-56 (Ark. 1968); Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 96-123 (Apr. 29, 1996); Ark. Att’y
Gen. Op. No. 84-91 (Mar. 20, 1984); Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-202 (2016) (al-
though § 24-72-202(6)(II) exempts work product prepared for elected officials); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-200(1)(A) (2017) (covering almost all political bodies and institutions
within Connecticut, including the legislature and its committees); Florida, FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 24(a) (stating that legislative, executive, and judicial branches all fall within the scope of
“the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official
business of any public body officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their be-
half ”); Illinois, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/2(a) (2017) (including state legislature and its commit-
tees); but see id. 140/7(f) (exempting working papers, preliminary drafts, and opinions under
deliberative process clause); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 22.1(1) (2017) (incorporating the state leg-
islature in definition of public body); but see Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Dwyer, 542
N.W.2d 491, 503 (Iowa 1996) (holding senate maintains constitutionally granted power to
establish its own rules, which may run counter to the Iowa Open Records Law); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-217(f)(1) (2016); but see id. § 45-221(20) (exempting “[n]otes, preliminary
drafts, [and] research data in the process of analysis” and all “recommendations or other
records in which opinions are expressed or policies or actions are proposed” except “when such
records are publicly cited or identified in an open meeting or in an agenda of an open meet-
ing”); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.870(1) (West 2017); Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44:1(A)(1) (2011); but see LA. CONST. art. III, § 8 (granting the legislature certain ex-
emptions); Maine, ME. STAT. tit. 1, § 402(2)(A) (2017); but see id. § 402(2)(F), (3)(J) (exempting
working papers of legislatures under deliberative process exemption); Maryland, see MD.
CODE ANN., GEN. PROVS. § 4-101(j) (LexisNexis 2018) (including state legislature and its
committees); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.232(d)(ii) (2017); Mississippi, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 25-61-3(a) (2017); but see id. § 25-61-17 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
as denying the Legislature the right to determine the rules of its own proceedings and to
regulate public access to its records.”); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 610.010(4) (2016);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.01(1) (2017); but see id. § 84-712.05(12) (allowing
individual legislators to rely on deliberative process exemptions to exempt their personal
working papers and contacts); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.005(5)(a)-(b) (2017); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:1-a(VI)(d) (2017); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-
2-6(F) (West 2017); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1(a) (2017); North Dakota, N.D.
CONST. art. XI, § 6; but see N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18.6 (2017) (exempting legislative work
product); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.011(A) (LexisNexis 2018); Pennsylvania, 65 PA.
STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 67.102, 67.303 (West 2017); Rhode Island, 38 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 38-2-2(1) (2017); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (2017); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-1.1 (2017); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A) (2017)
(applying to “any governmental entity”); but see id. § 3-10-108(a) (exempting confidential
documents held on the legislative computer system); Texas, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 552.003(1)(A)(i) (West 2017); but see id. § 552.106(a) (excluding certain categories of infor-
mation pertinent to the legislature and drafts or working papers involved in the preparation
of proposed legislation); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-103(11)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2017);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(a)(2) (2017); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3701 (2017);
but see id. § 2.2-3705.7(2) (exempting from disclosure working papers and correspondence
prepared by or for members of the General Assembly or the Division of Legislative Services);
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meetings statutes.47 For example, Mississippi statute defines a “pub-
lic body” as including “any standing, interim or special committee
of the Mississippi Legislature.”48 In some states, such as Washing-
ton and Maine, redistricting statutes explicitly subject the appor-
tionment process to the state’s open meetings laws.49
While legislative action, including redistricting, may be subject to
state open records and open meetings laws, in seven states (and at
the federal level), open records/meetings laws do not apply to the
legislative branch.50 Further, courts in some states have held that
West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-2(4) (2017); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 19.32(1) (2017); but
see id. § 19.34(1) (exempting legislature from law requiring departments to post methods for
filing a records request); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-201(a)(v) (2017).
47. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 36-25A-2(4) (2017); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-
200(1)(A); Florida, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(b); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318(a) (2016);
Louisiana, LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:13(3) (2017); Maine, ME. STAT. tit. 1, § 402(2)(A); Michigan,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.262(a); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 3.055(1) (2017); Mississippi, MISS.
CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a); Nevada, NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 15 ; New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 91-A:1-a(VI)(d); New Mexico, N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 12; New York, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§ 102(3) (McKinney 2017); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.14A(a), 143-318.18
(2017); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-17.1(13); Oregon, OR. CONST. art. IV, § 14; OR.
REV. STAT. § 192.610(4) (2015); Rhode Island, 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-2(3) (2017); South
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20; Tennessee, see Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888, 892
(Tenn. 1976) (holding Open Meetings Act applies to any board or commission created by the
legislature); but see TENN. CONST. art. II, § 22; Texas, TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 551.001(3),
551.003 (2017); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-103 (LexisNexis 2017); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 310(3), 313(c); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3707.01(B); West Virginia, W. VA.
CODE § 6-9A-2(7).
48. MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-41-3(a).
49. Washington’s Redistricting Act requires the state commission to abide by Title 42 of
the Washington Code, which covers all public officers, public meetings, and public records.
WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.080 (2017). Maine’s statute identifies legislative committees,
including the apportionment committee, as being subject to Freedom of Access requests. ME.
STAT. tit. 1, § 402(1-A). In the 2010 round, Pennsylvania’s state redistricting website included
a tab that allowed users to submit a request for access to committee records under the state’s
Right-to-Know statute. See Right-to-Know, PA. REDISTRICTING, http://www.redistricting.state.
pa.us/RTKL.cfm [https://perma.cc/YMV6-84FF].
50. Six states explicitly exempt legislatures from public access statutes either in the text
of the statute or by court ruling: Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(h) (2017) (“‘Public
body’ shall not include any caucus of the House of Representatives or Senate of the State.”);
Georgia, see Fathers Are Parents Too, Inc. v. Hunstein, 415 S.E.2d 322, 322 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that the “Legislature ha[s] historically exercised the authority to adopt its own
internal operating procedures, and ha[s] subsequently adopted ... procedures ... inconsistent
with the [Open Meetings] Act” (citing Coggin v. Davey, 211 S.E.2d 708 (1975))); Indiana, see
State ex rel. Masariu v. Marion Superior Court, 621 N.E.2d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 1993) (citing
separation of powers considerations as block to open records access); Massachusetts, see MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 18 (2017); New York, see N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 86(3) (McKinney 2017);
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legislative line-drawers are not bound by open records and open
meetings rules, typically citing some version of legislative privi-
lege.51 In Pick v. Nelson, for example, the Nebraska Supreme Court
cited legislative process protections that insulate the redistricting
process from notice and open hearings requirements.52 In some
cases, line-drawers have evaded open meetings statutes by holding
one-on-one discussions or through other procedural mechanisms.53
Legislative privilege rules routinely shroud all or part of re-
districting deliberations from public view. Provisions in state con-
stitutions conferring legislative privilege largely track federal
constitutional language.54 Forty-three state constitutions provide a
legislative privilege to varying degrees.55 New York’s constitution
Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.3 (2017); and Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 195.
410(5). Alabama’s open records regime is unclear as to whether it applies to the legislature.
The question of whether open records statutes apply to legislative records has been the
subject of litigation in Nevada. When members of the press sought access to legislators’
emails, the legislature passed a statute specifically exempting them from Nevada open records
laws. See Michelle Rindels, Nevada Legislature Excuses Itself from Public Records Law, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (Mar. 13, 2016, 6:18 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/politics/government/
nevada-legislature-excuses-itself-public-records-law [https://perma.cc/PFQ7-VT4Z].
51. Often, courts will cite some version of separation of powers in their reasoning. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Masariu, 621 N.E.2d at 1098 (ruling that the law cannot be enforced against
the legislature due to separation of powers considerations); see also State ex rel. Ozanne v.
Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Wis. 2011) (ruling that separation of powers principles
preclude judicial review of the legislature’s compliance with its own rules of procedure
concerning passage of legislation, whether those rules are internal or statutory). For an
example of a court so holding in the independent commission context, see infra note 100 and
accompanying text (describing a Missouri court’s finding that the commission did not qualify
as a public body under the state’s open records laws).
52. 528 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Neb. 1995) (“[T]he formation of representative districts is ... a
legislative process [because] ‘[t]here is no constitutional due process requirement of notice
and hearing applicable to legislative matters.’” (quoting Barnett v. Boyle, 250 N.W.2d 635,
637 (Neb. 1977))). In Pick v. Nelson, plaintiffs brought a due process challenge, not an open
records challenge, to the closed process, but the principle upon which the court relied is the
same: legislatures enjoy protections and courts do not. See id.
53. See Willems v. State, 325 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Mont. 2014) (finding that the open meeting
law’s “definition of ‘meeting’ does not include ‘serial one-on-one discussions’”). Note that such
“evasion” is not necessarily nefarious. Indeed, as will be discussed later, deliberative space
is a necessary component of the redistricting process. See infra note 175.
54. At the federal level, legislative privilege derives from the U.S. Constitution’s Speech
and Debate Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“Senators and Representatives ... shall in all
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged ... for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”).
55. See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State
Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 224 (2003).
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requires that “[f]or any speech or debate in either house of the leg-
islature, the members shall not be questioned in any other place.”56
Vermont’s constitution provides that “[t]he freedom of deliberation,
speech, and debate, in the Legislature, is so essential to the rights
of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or
prosecution, action or complaint, in any other court or place whatso-
ever.”57
Scholars have argued that legislative privilege in redistricting is
needed, in part to prevent legislators being sapped of time in com-
plying with discovery requests during a politically charged process
sure to contain foes bent on casting doubt.58 Others counter that
legislative privilege rules should not be absolute in redistricting,
suggesting that other means could be employed to prevent frivolous
discovery requests.59 Recent case law makes clear that, at least in
some instances, courts have been willing to uphold legislative
privilege in redistricting litigation. For example, in 2016, a state
court reversed a contempt of court order against Virginia legislators
for failing to produce redistricting documents including related
emails from or to legislators.60 The court described at length the
expanse of the legislative privilege in Virginia, noting that it can
even extend to nonlegislators “functioning in a legislative capacity
on behalf and at the direction” of a legislator.61
In 2015, a federal court in Virginia found Virginia’s legislative
privilege boundaries more malleable. In Bethune-Hill v. Virginia
56. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 11.
57. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 14.
58. Huefner, supra note 55, at 270 (analyzing state legislative privilege protections and
arguing that two reasons support a broad interpretation: “(1) providing absolute protection
from the harms and burdens, both incidental and deliberate, that might otherwise result from
judicial intrusions into the legislative process, and (2) freeing legislators to deliberate more
candidly and creatively among themselves and their staff by granting them fuller autonomy
and allowing them to preserve confidences where desired”).
59. See, e.g., Mark Tyson, Comment, Monitored Disclosure: A Way to Avoid Legislative
Supremacy in Redistricting Litigation, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1298 (2012) (discussing the
application of legislative privilege to redistricting litigation discovery specifically and arguing
that courts should shy away from finding an absolute disclosure privilege in redistricting
cases).
60. Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469, 483 (Va. 2016).
61. Id. at 481. Note, however, that ultimately the Virginia Supreme Court did not rule on
the privileged nature of the redistricting documents, remanding the case back to the circuit
court. See id. at 483-84.
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State Board of Elections, plaintiffs sought production of Virginia
legislative documents and emails in their case challenging legisla-
tive districts as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.62 In ruling on
the discovery motion, the district court prefaced its discussion of
legislative privilege by noting that “where important federal inter-
ests are at stake” (in this instance, a racial gerrymandering claim),
state legislative privilege faces limitations.63 Because redistricting
litigation requires “judicial inquiries into legislative ... motivation,”
the district court recognized “extraordinary” factors and held only
qualified legislative privilege applied.64 
In League of Women Voters of Florida v. Florida House of Rep-
resentatives, the Florida Supreme Court found that although the
legislative privilege generally existed, it did not shield legislative
redistricting materials.65 Part of the court’s reasoning can be ex-
plained by its need to evaluate legislative motive to enforce state
constitutional commands. Florida’s constitution provision (estab-
lished via ballot initiative in 2010) explicitly forbids partisanship in
62. 114 F. Supp. 3d 323, 329 (E.D. Va. 2015).
63. Id. at 333 (quoting United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980)) (deriving the
legislative privilege not from the Virginia Constitution, but from federal common law).
64. Id. at 337. Once it had so determined, the court held that the legislature must disclose
selective documents, including: (1) documents or communications, including emails, created
following the enactment of the redistricting legislation; (2) documents or communications
shared with or received from anyone outside of the legislature; and (3) “internal” legislative
documents or communications “reflecting strictly factual information” and those “produced
by committee.” Id. at 343. The court allowed redactions of legislator opinions, comments, or
requests. Id. The court further held that four legislators had waived their privilege by
refusing to respond to the litigation. Id. The court placed the burden of determining the
privileged nature of any remaining documents on the legislature, offering guidelines the
legislature may use. Id. at 344-45. Finally, the court held that any communications between
legislators and the Virginia Attorney General were not protected by attorney-client privilege
because the Attorney General only provides legal advice to the executive branch. Id. at 347.
Texas provides another example of a court that pierced legislative privilege in redistricting.
After the 2010 cycle, a group of Latino plaintiffs challenged maps in Texas, alleging racial and
partisan gerrymandering claims. See Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint at 3-6, Perez v.
State, 970 F. Supp. 2d 593 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No. 5:11-CV-0360-OLG-JES-XR). During the
discovery process, plaintiffs sought written communications between members of the U.S.
Congress and Texas state legislators. See Order at *1, Perez, 970 F. Supp. 2d (No. 11-CA-360-
OLG-JES-XR). Members of Congress asserted legislative privilege as barring access. See id.
A district court in Texas denied the assertion and required the congressmen to comply with
discovery requests. See id. at *3 (denying defendants’ motion to prevent disclosure of the
written communications).
65. 132 So. 3d 135, 154 (Fla. 2013).
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redistricting.66 The Florida Supreme Court created a balancing test
for the redistricting process to help courts charged with evaluating
alleged violations of the partisanship prohibition.67 Using this test,
the court found that the documents in question were the sole means
of determining the presence of political motivation in the districting
process, making protection less important than compliance with the
specific constitutional command.68
These cases demonstrate the difficulties of applying legislative
privilege in the redistricting context. Some courts decline to pierce
legislative privilege in redistricting,69 others are not so moved.70 As
scholars have noted elsewhere, legislative privilege is increasingly
at odds with the open government movement.71 The spotlight on re-
districting in the 2020 round may well bring these questions closer
to the fore. Cases thus far suggest that in instances in which leg-
islators seek to shield redistricting deliberations from public view,
legislative privilege will only provide protection inasmuch as a com-
peting rationale for access is surmountable. When federal and state
constitutional claims require evidence of legislative motive, the veil
may be particularly susceptible.
Overall, in noncommission states, redistricting transparency
rules are spotty at best. Even states with comprehensive statutory
schemes promoting transparency are not insulated from the critique
that such provisions pay lip service to transparency while the real
process unfolds behind closed doors.72 State open meetings and open
records laws can provide a means of public access and oversight, but
66. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a).
67. Courts must balance legislative privilege against competing and compelling interest
in complying with the state constitutional prohibition on partisan political gerrymandering.
See League of Women Voters, 132 So. 3d at 138, 147.
68. Id. at 154.
69. See Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469, 483 (Va. 2016).
70. See supra Part I.A.
71. Huefner, supra note 55, at 227 (“[N]ew issues of state legislative privilege are likely
to arise as a result of the trend towards open government.”).
72. See, e.g., Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294-95 (D. Mass.
2004) (overturning a Massachusetts redistricting plan for violating section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act). One of the main issues was that the Special Joint Committee did not meet
together as a body, except at the five public hearings. Id. at 295. Rather, the two members—
the chair and another—dominated the process. Id. The chair did not accept views from leaders
of communities of interest, despite the public hearings. Id.
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exemptions for legislative actions and legislative privilege can cut
the other way.
The next Section examines how transparency fares in states in
which independent commissions draw the lines.
B. Transparency and Redistricting Commissions
Thirteen states empower redistricting commissions to draw state
legislative districts and, in some cases, U.S. congressional districts
with varying degrees of input from elected officials, ranging from
politician commissions to citizen commissions.73 In theory, by tak-
ing line-drawing power away from legislators, independent redis-
tricting commissions, almost by definition, prevent the smoke-filled-
room approach to redistricting. That said, a common critique of
independent commissions is that they take power from accountable
members of state legislatures only to put it in the hands of unelect-
ed and unaccountable commission members.74 To combat this con-
cern, independent commissions employ a variety of mechanisms to
enable public oversight and participation.75 Particularly in states
73. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 23.
74. See Huefner, supra note 15, at 55 (“[O]ne of the more effective arguments against an
independent redistricting commission often has been that it would render the redistricters
unaccountable to the voters: once they are appointed, the public loses control over them. For
instance, precisely this argument figured prominently in the campaigns to defeat the 2005
Ohio and California ballot measures.”); see also Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct
Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 690 (2006)
(“[Independent commissions’] political insulation renders them decidedly unaccountable to the
electorate and isolated from popular sentiment.”).
75. Some states, like Colorado, embed redistricting transparency into their commission’s
constitutional framework. Colorado’s constitution charges the Redistricting Commission with
keeping a public record of all proceedings of the commission and publication and distribution
of copies of each redistricting plan. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(e). Hawaii, which has used a
commission to draw state and U.S. congressional lines since 1968, is another example of a
state with a detailed statutory redistricting transparency scheme. HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2
(2017) (by statute, Hawaii’s commission must “conduct public hearings and consult with the
apportionment advisory council of each basic island unit.... [I]n each basic island unit, public
notice of a legislative reapportionment plan [shall be given].... At least one public hearing on
the proposed ... plan shall be held in each basic island unit.... The notice shall include a
statement of the substance of the proposed ... plan, and of the date, time, and place where
interested persons may be heard.... All interested persons shall be ... [able] to submit data,
views, or arguments, orally or in writing, for consideration by the commission.... [The com-
mission] shall [give] public notice ... of the final ... plan [before it goes into effect].”) The Ohio
independent commission’s transparency rules have yet to be tested. Ohio’s newly amended
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with commissions formed more recently, transparency provisions
are robust. California provides the perfect example.
California’s process, which resulted from popular calls for reform
culminating in a successful 2008 ballot initiative to install a com-
mission, built its commission process around the idea of transpar-
ency.76 California voters chose to compose its commission entirely of
members of the public.77 California’s constitutional amendment re-
quires that its Citizens Redistricting Commission “conduct an open
and transparent process enabling full public consideration of and
comment on the drawing of district lines.”78 Far from deliberating
in the dark, the California Constitution mandates transparency and
requires the commission to issue a report explaining the basis on
which its decisions were made.79
California statutes further buttress public access and input at
various stages in the process. The public must be given fourteen
days’ notice of meetings during which public input is to be receiv-
ed.80 Commission’s records must be posted online to ensure immedi-
ate and widespread public access.81 California’s commission process
also includes an extensive outreach program to solicit broad public
participation.82 Public hearings are to take place both before and
after maps are drawn.83 Finally, maps are displayed for public
comment to achieve the widest public access possible, and public
constitution requires the state Redistricting Commission (which will draw maps for state
legislative districts only in 2020) to release to the public a proposed general assembly district
plan and then hold at least “three public hearings across the state to present the proposed
plan and ... seek public input.” OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1(C). The constitution mandates that
all meetings of the commission be open to the public and be broadcast electronically. Id.
Drafters of the initiative were likely prompted to include such transparency protections
because of the lack of transparency in previous rounds. In 2012, electors brought suit in the
Ohio Supreme Court for a declaration that the Apportionment Board failed to comply with
Ohio’s Open Meetings Law. Wilson v. Kasich, 963 N.E.2d 1282, 1283 (Ohio 2012) (per curiam).
In a very short opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to address
plaintiffs’ open meetings claim. Id.
76. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(b).
77. Id. § 2(c)(2)-(3).
78. Id. § 2(b)(1).
79. Id. § 2(h).
80. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(a)(1) (West 2017).
81. Id. § 8253(b).
82. Id. § 8253(a)(7).
83. Id.
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comment must be taken for at least fourteen days from the date of
display of the first preliminary maps.84
California’s Citizens Redistricting Commission won high marks
for its transparency measures during the 2010 round in a League of
Women Voters commissioned report called When the People Draw
the Lines examining the 2010 commission process. The report cited
a comparative study of transparency of state governing processes.85
The report gave California a B- rating overall, but the state’s citizen
redistricting process received an A, scoring an impressive score of
100/100.86 Scholars praised the commission’s transparent and
participatory process,87 as did courts.88
Several commission states lack detailed transparency require-
ments for how their commissions must operate. Alaska’s consti-
tution, for example, mandates that public hearings be held on
84. Id.
85. See RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL., WHEN THE PEOPLE
DRAW THE LINES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS
2-3 (2013).
86. Id. at 3.
87. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission,
23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 313-14 (2012).
88. In 2012, for example, the California Supreme Court lauded the commission’s efforts
to ensure transparency. In a case affirming the commission’s maps, the court took pains to
demonstrate the legitimacy of those maps by detailing the transparency and public input
measures the commission employed. Vandermost v. Bowen, 269 P.3d 446, 457 (Cal. 2012)
(detailing the degree to which the commission conducted a transparent process: “[The Com-
mission] held more than 70 business meetings and 34 public hearings in 32 cities throughout
the state. Generally, the Commission’s hearings were scheduled in the early evening hours
at school or government locations in the center of a community, making it convenient for
‘average citizens’ to participate. It regularly allowed public input and comment at its business
meetings as well. Its educational materials were broadly distributed in English and six other
languages (Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Tagalog, and Vietnamese), and it ultimately
received, in addition to oral testimony, more than 2,000 written submissions, including maps
reflecting statewide, regional, or other districts. The Commission’s staff received ‘written
comments, input and suggestions from more than 20,000 individuals and groups.’ The
Commission held 23 public input hearings before issuing a set of its draft maps in June of
2011. After a five-day public review period, it held 11 more public input hearings around the
state to collect reactions to and comments concerning those draft maps. It held 22 business
meetings in Sacramento to discuss the draft maps, at which more than 276 people appeared
and commented. All of the Commission’s public meetings were ‘live-streamed,’ captured on
video, and placed on the Commission’s Web site for public viewing. All of the Commission’s
completed documents, and those of its staff, were posted on the Commission’s Web site for
public viewing as well.” (citations omitted)). The extent of the commission’s efforts to ensure
transparency and meaningful public input played heavily into the court’s decision to allow the
commission’s map to be used in the relevant upcoming election. See id.
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proposed plans,89 but its statutes put little meat on transparency’s
bones.90 Still, as in noncommission states lacking statutory trans-
parency mandates, Alaska’s commission nevertheless incorporated
measures into its process leading the Alaska Supreme Court to
praise its transparency efforts in the 2010 round.91
Montana likewise went above and beyond statutory mandates
during the last round. Montana statute requires its independent
commission to hold at least one public meeting at the state capitol
before submitting its plan to the legislature.92 In practice, Monta-
na’s commission held many public hearings in the 2010 round—over
thirty between 2009 and 2013.93 New Jersey also falls into this
89. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §§ 3-4, 6, 8-11.
90. ALASKA STAT. § 15.10.300 (2017) discusses redistricting but does not provide addi-
tional transparency measures. Washington is another example of a commission state that
outlines basic transparency protections by statute, in this case its State Redistricting Act. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.080 (2017). The Act requires the commission to comply with
requirements to disclose and preserve public records, hold open meetings pursuant to the
Open Meetings Act, prepare and disclose minutes, and prepare and publish a report with the
plan to be made available to the public at the time the plan is published. Id. § 44.05.080(3)-(5),
(7). The report must include the percentage deviation from average district population for
every district, explain the criteria used in developing the plan with justification of any
deviation, and contain a map of all the districts. Id. § 44.05.080(7).
91. In the 1990s, Alaska’s advisory commission ran into transparency trouble. In inval-
idating the 1990 maps, a district court cited a failure to abide by Alaska’s open records and
open meetings laws as part of the basis for invalidating the maps. See Hickel v. Se. Confer-
ence, 846 P.2d 38, 43 (Alaska 1992) (noting “the [Advisory] Board violated the Open Meetings
Act, AS 44.62.310 [and] ... concluded that the Board [also] violated the Public Records Act, AS
09.25.110-140”), modified, 868 P.2d 919 (1994). The Alaska Supreme Court later affirmed the
district court’s sunshine law holdings in the case. See Hickel v. Se. Conference, 868 P.2d 919,
930 (Alaska 1994). This may in part explain its more recent efforts to provide transparency
mechanisms in later rounds. In the 2010 round, for example, after Alaska had shifted to an
independent commission, the Alaska Supreme Court praised the commission’s transparency
efforts: “At the outset, we commend the Board for its diligence and dedication throughout the
redistricting process. The record demonstrates that the Board ... considered a great deal of
input from Alaska’s citizens.” In re 2011 Redistricting Cases, 274 P.3d 466, 466 (Alaska 2012).
The court nevertheless invalidated the maps as violating, inter alia, provisions of the federal
Voting Rights Act. Id.
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-1-108(2) (2017).
93. For a description of the open hearings held, see MONT. DISTRICTING & APPORTIONMENT
COMM’N, MONT. LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING PLAN AS SUBMITTED TO THE 63RD
MONTANA LEGISLATURE: BASED ON THE 2010 CENSUS 11 (2013); see also Willems v. State, 325
P.3d 1204, 1208 (Mont. 2014) (noting that the “Commission went to great lengths during most
of its existence to encourage openness and public participation”). This did not stop plaintiffs
from challenging the openness of the Montana commission. Plaintiffs argued that one-on-one
discussions should have been observable to the public under state open meetings laws. See
Willems, 325 P.3d at 1208. The Montana Supreme Court held that the open meetings
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category. The New Jersey Constitution requires its congressional
redistricting commission to hold at least three public hearings in
different parts of the state, and, if convenient, to review plans sub-
mitted by the public.94 In practice, the New Jersey Commission held
nine public meetings during the 2010 round, and, although there is
no constitutional or statutory mandate for public meetings in the
case of state legislative districts, the state legislative commission
nevertheless held public hearings (in fact, more than its congres-
sional committee).95
Going further than required in implementing transparency mea-
sures did not insulate the New Jersey Commission. A group of plain-
tiffs alleged that the process of creating state legislative maps shut
out the general public and favored an outsized level of access to
party elite.96 Because New Jersey’s commissions are not subject to
its open meetings laws,97 plaintiffs alleged commissioners were
emboldened to hold a series of secret meetings behind closed doors
prompting the claim that the commission had been unduly influ-
enced by private parties.98 Not persuaded, the trial court, appeals
court, and the New Jersey Supreme Court all agreed to dismiss the
case. The trial court noted that the state legislative commission was
nowhere required to hold public meetings and credited the commis-
sion for choosing to hold more meetings than the congressional
redistricting committee.99 In this way, the New Jersey Commission’s
efforts to promote transparency (even if only an exercise in lip ser-
vice, according to plaintiffs in the case challenging the process) paid
off.100
statutory definition of “meeting” does not include “serial one-on-one discussions.” Id. at 1209.
94. N.J. CONST. art. II, § II, para. 4.
95. See Public Meetings, N.J. APPORTIONMENT COMMISSION, http://www.apportionment
commission.org/schedule.asp [https://perma.cc/HU47-DTL4].
96. See Gonzalez v. State Apportionment Comm’n, 53 A.3d 1230, 1235 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2012).
97. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-7 (West 2017).
98.  See Gonzalez, 53 A.3d at 1235.
99. Id. at 1253-54.
100. In Missouri, a court came to the opposite conclusion with respect to a judicially
appointed committee empaneled when its independent commission could not agree on maps
during the 2000 cycle. In Johnson v. State, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that its
nonpartisan reapportionment commission, appointed to file a new apportionment plan after
the bipartisan reapportionment commission failed to meet a deadline, was not subject to the
state’s sunshine law. 366 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Mo. 2012). The court concluded that the commission
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The Idaho commission’s transparency framework, which requires
that the commission hold meetings in different portions of the state,
also came under attack as “transparency in name only” during the
2000 cycle.101 Plaintiffs brought a challenge asserting that the
commission violated the state’s transparency statute because cit-
izens were not given an opportunity to review and discuss the plan
ultimately adopted by the commission.102 Although the commission
complied with the literal language of its redistricting transparency
statute by holding meetings throughout the state, plaintiffs alleged
it failed to fulfill the spirit of the statute because at no time was the
plan placed before the public for review.103 Rather, it was adopted
“at the last minute behind closed doors,” depriving citizens of the
opportunity to provide feedback on the division of a county when
such division was not contemplated by the plans shared with the
public.104 The court granted plaintiffs’ petition to enjoin the map on
a separate claim; only a concurring Idaho Supreme Court justice
addressed the transparency claim, concluding that the commission
violated its statutory duty to “maximize the opportunity for public
participation.”105
In several states that established a commission approach before
the digital age, transparency provisions still on the books are anti-
quated. For example, Pennsylvania’s 1968 constitutional provision
requires that its politician commission publish its state legislative
district plan in at least one newspaper of general circulation in each
district.106 Multiple proposals to reform Pennsylvania’s independent
was a judicial entity made up of court of appeals judges and that the judges were not op-
erating in an administrative capacity; therefore, it was exempt from the definition of “public
governmental body.” Id. at 16, 22. As a result, the court held that the commission’s three
closed meetings, convened without public notice or minutes taken, did not violate the sun-
shine law. Id. at 22.
101. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(4); IDAHO CODE § 72-1505(4) (2017). Note, too, that Idaho’s
redistricting process is subject to state public access laws. IDAHO CODE § 72-1505(1).
102. Smith v. Idaho Comm’n on Redistricting, 38 P.3d 121, 125 (Idaho 2001) (Kidwell, J.,
specially concurring).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 126.
106. To constitute Pennsylvania’s commission to draw state legislative districts, majority
and minority leaders of the legislative houses each select one member. These four then select
a fifth to chair who cannot be a public official. PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(b), (i) (“The publication
shall contain a map of the Commonwealth showing the complete reapportionment of the
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commission include detailed transparency provisions, most notably
the proposed Redistricting Openness and Fairness Act which would
provide for thirty days of public comment on preliminary plans,
enable Pennsylvanians to submit plans of their own to be considered
by the commission, give the public access to software and demo-
graphic data to prepare alternate plans, and require five public
hearings in different regions of the state.107
In all, independent commission states receive relatively higher
marks on transparency. States that established independent
commissions more recently tend to have stronger, more explicit
transparency mandates. Independent commission states that lack
rigorous transparency requirements tend in practice to go beyond
what is required. Still, as evidenced by litigation and reform pro-
posals in several commission states, the public may well remain
dissatisfied with transparency measures state commissions employ.
This discussion reveals that what a state has or does not have on
the books does not necessarily dictate the degree of public satisfac-
tion in the openness of the process. The next Section examines the
extent to which the technological innovation that spurred public
participation and oversight in the 2010 round holds promise in
addressing public dissatisfaction with traditional transparency
mechanisms.
C. Technological Innovation and Redistricting Transparency
In the past few rounds, states have experimented with technologi-
cal means of improving public oversight of and participation in the
General Assembly by districts, and a map showing the reapportionment districts in the area
normally served by the newspaper in which the publication is made. The publication shall also
state the population of the senatorial and representative districts having the smallest and
largest population and the percentage variation of such districts from the average population
for senatorial and representative districts.”). Note that Pennsylvania’s Sunshine Act includes
the Redistricting Commission in the bodies it governs. See 65 PA. CONS. STAT. § 703 (2018).
Note that Pennsylvania’s Legislative Reapportionment Commission is explicitly defined by
its open records statute as a legislative agency, making it subject to open records laws. See
65 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.102 (West 2018). Hawaii is another example of a state
that updated its transparency procedures to reflect the times. In 1998, Hawaii updated its
statute from requiring that notices of redistricting meetings be “published in a newspaper of
general circulation” to the broader requirement to give “public notice.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-
2(a) (2017).
107. H.B. 878, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015).
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redistricting process, on occasion mandating its use by statute. For
example, an Oregon statute requires public access to public
hearings via teleconference to permit active citizen participation
throughout the state.108 Individuals in remote locations must be
permitted to provide public testimony at the hearings through video
equipment.109 Other states have experimented with various ap-
proaches to enable remote access to redistricting hearings and ma-
terials through streaming, video-conferencing, and other means.110
Particularly in rural states where traveling to a central location is
more difficult, technology can provide a valuable bridge.
By far the biggest innovation in redistricting transparency has
been the open-redistricting movement. Scholars elsewhere have de-
scribed in detail the enormous impact of technological innovation in
the realm of redistricting.111 Michael McDonald and Micah Altman
have been particularly thorough in documenting technology’s prom-
ise and the challenges its use presents.112 They describe how com-
puters revolutionized redistricting starting in the 1960s.113 Many
thought using computers to redistrict might limit or even eliminate
108. OR. REV. STAT. § 188.016(1)-(2) (2017).
109. Id. § 188.016(3)(d).
110. Arizona and Florida are examples of two states that live streamed redistricting
meetings and made video archives available on the states’ redistricting websites. See, e.g.,
Meeting Videos, FLORIDAREDISTRICTING, https://mydistrictbuilder.wordpress.com/meeting-
videos [https://perma.cc/8WQY-WK2W] (listing Florida’s archived meeting videos). Arizona
streamed meetings from its website. Stream, ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, https://
azredistricting.org/stream [https://perma.cc/WYF4-ZHNK].
111. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33
UCLA L. REV. 77, 124-25 (1985); Stuart S. Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redis-
tricting, 17 STAN. L. REV. 863, 863 (1965) (describing computer program implementing
redistricting algorithm); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and
Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1352 n.110 (1987); James B. Weaver
& Sidney W. Hess, A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting: Development of Computer
Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288, 301 (1963) (describing a computer program implementing re-
districting algorithm based on mathematical techniques of operations research).
112. Micah Altman et al., Pushbutton Gerrymanders? How Computing Has Changed
Redistricting, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDIS-
TRICTING 51, 51-52 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005); Micah Altman & Michael
P. McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles: Shifting from Rural Mal-
apportionment to Voting Rights to Public Participation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (2013)
[hereinafter Altman & McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles]; Micah
Altman & Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers in Redistricting, 5 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 70 (2010) [hereinafter Altman & McDonald, Promise and Perils].
113. See Altman & McDonald, Promise and Perils, supra note 112, at 71.
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human bias in the process.114 As that debate unfolded (and contin-
ues to unfold),115 the role of computers in making the process more
transparent began to crystallize. Starting in the 1990s, in what
Altman and McDonald refer to as the “open redistricting move-
ment,” computer scientists began developing software that, when
populated with state redistricting data, enabled members of the
public to try their hand at drawing maps.116 Early on, states exper-
imented with making available a public computer in a state library
or state office that enabled members of the public to create district
maps.117 During the 2000 cycle, eighteen states maintained some
form of public terminal that enabled such public participation.118 As
Altman and McDonald note, it was not until the 2000s that it
became possible (from a cost and technological standpoint) to sig-
nificantly broaden the availability of these tools.119
In 2007, Chris Swain of the USC Game Innovation Lab created
“The ReDistricting Game,” an educational tool that allows users to
explore basic concepts in redistricting in a hypothetical envi-
ronment.120 For the first time, members of the public could put
themselves in the shoes of hypothetical line-drawers and gain ap-
preciation for trade-offs required to comply with state and federal
114. Id. at 72 (citing PIETRO GRILLI DI CORTONA ET AL., EVALUATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1999)).
115. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain et al., A Reasonable Bias Approach to Gerrymandering: Using
Automated Plan Generation to Evaluate Redistricting Proposals, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521
(2018); Yan Y. Liu et al., PEAR: A Massively Parallel Evolutionary Computation Approach for
Political Redistricting Optimization and Analysis, 30 SWARM & EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION
78, 89 (2016). See generally Wendy K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redis-
tricting Tool: A Computational Method for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15
ELECTION L.J. 351 (2016).
116. See Altman & McDonald, Promise and Perils, supra note 112, at 98.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 98-99 (noting that in the case of Arizona’s public terminal, only two well-organ-
ized interest groups used the tools provided to create maps). Altman and McDonald note that
these maps, along with public testimony, influenced the outcome in Arizona that round. Id.
119. Id. at 98.
120. See About the Game, THE REDISTRICTING GAME, http://redistrictinggame.org/about.
php [https://perma.cc/2D9Z-98G7]; see also Altman & McDonald, Promise and Perils, supra
note 112, at 99 (citing Michael Falcone, A Gamers Guide to Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES: THE
CAUCUS (June 14, 2007), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/a-gamers-guide-to-
redistricting). Writing in 2010, Altman and McDonald noted that the ReDistricting Game
“probably has led to more people drawing (hypothetical) redistricting maps in the last three
years than in the entire history of the nation.” Altman & McDonald, Promise and Perils, supra
note 112, at 99.
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laws—and grasp the power to manipulate lines for partisan ends.
Computer scientist Dave Bradlee created a platform that takes the
ReDistricting Game a step further. It allowed users to create con-
gressional districts using real data from the 2010 census in all fifty
states and Puerto Rico.121
Several states took advantage of the open-redistricting movement
to host redistricting competitions. In the 2010 cycle, five states
hosted various forms of competition that allowed members of the
public to draw alternative maps in their state.122 Virginia’s expe-
rience is illustrative. The Wason Center for Public Policy at Chris-
topher Newport University hosted a redistricting competition
enabling Virginia college and law students to compete for cash
prizes to draw alternative maps. The dual goals of the competition
were to educate the public about the redistricting process and pro-
duce a set of alternative maps separate from those generated within
Virginia’s very political process.123 Virginia’s competition was a
historical first, marking “the first time in American history that
such a competition was held while a state’s redistricting process was
underway, and the first to generate a legal plan.”124 Students crea-
ted a total of fifty-six plans for U.S. congressional and state leg-
islative districts in Virginia.125 As Altman and McDonald describe,
121. Dave Bradlee, Do Your Own Redistricting, DAVE’S REDISTRICTING, http://www.gardow.
com/davebradlee/redistricting/launchapp.html [https://perma.cc/3F83-EFP7].
122. The Ohio League of Women Voters hosted a redistricting competition in partnership
with various state representatives, Dr. Richard Gunter of Ohio State University, and then-
Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner using Geographic Information System (GIS) software.
See Redistricting Contest Open to All, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS OHIO, http://www.lwvohio.org/
site.cfm/In-The-News/Press-Releases/Redistricting-Contest.cfm [https://perma.cc/2J76-HP9Q].
The New York Student Redistricting Competition requested student-drawn maps of the New
York state legislative and congressional maps using Public Mapping Project Software. See
New York Student Redistricting Competition, 2012 N.Y. REDISTRICTING PROJECT, FORDHAM
U., http://www.redistrictny.org/student-competition [https://perma.cc/5PUQ-NM29]. The Mich-
igan Redistricting Collaborative and the Michigan Center for Election Law and Redistricting
and Common Cause Minnesota also hosted a 2010 redistricting competition. See Justin Levitt,
Michigan, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-MI.php [https://perma.
cc/TJ96-XJFU]; Justin Levitt, Minnesota, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.
edu/states-MN.php [https://perma.cc/6UJK-KXX8].
123. Altman & McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles, supra note 112,
at 792-93 (citing Brian McNeill, Va. College Students to Attempt Redistricting, ASSOCIATED
PRESS ST. & LOC. WIRE, Dec. 27, 2010).
124. Id. at 793.
125. Fifteen student teams (a total of 150 students) submitted thirteen congressional plans,
nine Senate plans, and six House of Delegates plans that met base-level legal requirements;
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the student plans “were substantively different from one another
and not simply plans that seemed to have been shuffled around
from one bill to another during the legislative process.”126 Represen-
tatives entered several student plans as bills in the General As-
sembly.127
The open redistricting movement flowered in California in the
2010 cycle. Over 20,000 individuals and groups in California offered
comments or maps at public meetings or through the commission’s
public portal.128 California’s transparency scheme requires that
three teams submitted plans for all six possible entries. Id. at 800.
126. Id.
127. See Tyler Whitley, Fight over Congressional Map Next for General Assembly,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 10, 2011), http://www.richmond.com/news/fight-over-
congressional-map-next-for-general-assembly/article_2dc8dfa5-8da0-5ff8-b00b-f0e0476
d14d8.html [https://perma.cc/7CBE-7ERQ]; see also Redistricting Plans, VA. DIVISION LEGIS.
SERVICES, http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/RedistrictingPlans.aspx [https://perma.cc/
45QZ-8VCB]. Describing the promise of Virginia’s competition, Altman and McDonald wrote, 
Enabled by appropriate technology, students were able to create legal redis-
tricting plans that demonstrated a much wider range of possibilities; generally
were better than the legislature’s plans, as measured by formal redistricting
criteria; and were much more competitive and balanced than any of the plans
actually adopted.... When many eyes look at a problem, it may be that someone
will discover a solution that no one has thought of before. This is particularly
true with redistricting, an extremely complex mathematical problem.
Harnessing the mind power of the crowd will promote a more robust discussion
of options than any one entity can devise on its own.
Altman & McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles, supra note 112, at 830-
31. Note that some have expressed skepticism about redistricting competitions. See, e.g.,
Justin Levitt, Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 528-29
(2011) (noting that deciding who “wins” raises a problematic set of concerns). Levitt suggests
that embedding certain features in contests would mitigate some of his concerns. He writes:
[I]f the population shares a commitment to certain representational goals,
contests that encourage members of the public to submit plans fulfilling those
goals in different ways provide transparent means to flesh out policy options. If
proxies for measuring those goals can be found with some relative precision,
then individuals can be encouraged to one-up each other en route to a range of
solutions more closely approaching a Pareto-optimal decision set. And if there
is a commitment to establish a pool of “winners,” rather than a single winning
plan, that flexibility may adequately accommodate inevitable imperfections in
the proxies or weighting process necessary for scoring contest results.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
128. Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens Redistricting
Commission, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 128-29 (2014) (“Many advocacy and civil rights
groups that had participated in prior redistricting cycles not only submitted statewide or
regional maps, they mobilized members and constituents to attend and testify at individual
hearings.”).
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public mapping software and redistricting data be made available
to the public.129 According to observers of California’s 2010 redis-
tricting process, plans submitted by the public helped frame “dis-
cussion of what was possible, particularly submissions by the civil
rights groups (due to the threat of potential litigation).”130 Evalua-
tions of public contributions to the California commission noted
positive influence;131 in some cases, proposed alternative maps un-
derwent serious consideration.132
With the exception of states like California, which passed re-
districting reform just as technological advances in service of redis-
tricting started to make significant strides, most state transparency
rules—if on the books at all—are limited to requiring public hear-
ings and publishing proposed maps for public review with varying
degrees of notice and public participation requirements. Many of the
most recent crop of proposed transparency bills include provisions
that incorporate technology.133 Examples include requirements that
129. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8253(b) (West 2013) (“The Legislature shall take all steps neces-
sary to ensure that a complete and accurate computerized database is available for redis-
tricting, and that procedures are in place to provide the public ready access to redistricting
data and computer software for drawing maps.”).
130. Karin Mac Donald & Bruce E. Cain, Community of Interest Methodology and Public
Testimony, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609, 615 (2013). The authors describe other forms of public
input, such as comments describing local communities of interest to inform the commission
with the hope these communities would be kept together, and, later, public reactions to
specific commission-proposed lines. See id.
131. Justin Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen Commission Implementation of the
Voting Rights Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1041, 1082, 1093 (2013) (discussing positive impact
of public testimony on Voting Rights Act compliance). 
132. Id. at 1102-03 (describing the commission’s consideration of the Mexican-American
Legal Defense Fund’s alternative map submission). According to the Center for Public
Integrity’s analysis of redistricting transparency in the 2010 round, only nine states received
a 0/100 score for whether the state government accepted plans submitted by members of the
public (Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
and Wisconsin). See Caitlin Ginley, Grading the Nation: How Accountable Is Your State?, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 19, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/19/
8423/grading-nation-how-accountable-your-state [https://perma.cc/K6KE-HJ7M].
133. Reformers in many states have proposed bills that incorporate enhanced redistricting
transparency measures: Arizona, H.R. Con. Res. 2030, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017);
Delaware, S. 270, 148th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015); Illinois, H.R.J. Res. 0021,
100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017); Indiana, H. 1014, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2017); Kansas, S. Con. Res. 1609, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2016); Maryland, H.
367, 437th Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2017); Michigan, S. 82, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017);
Nebraska, Legis. 653, 105th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2017); Legis. 216, 105th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2017); Legis. 580, 104th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2016); New Jersey, G.A. Con. Res. 93, 217th Leg.,
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states make redistricting software available to the public to draw
their own maps,134 a proposal that would require a commission to
accept and then score such plans submitted by the public,135 increas-
ingly common requirements like live-streaming public hearings,136
and the creation of public access and input portals on state redis-
tricting websites.137
Technology will play an enhanced role in redistricting transpar-
ency in 2020. What remains to be seen is how effective individual
states will be in harnessing its potential and limiting its harm.
II. THE PERILS OF TRANSPARENCY IN REDISTRICTING
After surveying the contours of state redistricting rules and the
promise of technology in enhancing public oversight of and partici-
pation in the process, the following question must be asked: Is
redistricting transparency an unqualified good? As states think
through how to structure redistricting transparency rules in the
upcoming round, is more transparency always better? Does greater
transparency inevitably ensure an informed citizenry, provide
accountability, and build public trust in the process?
1st Sess. (N.J. 2016); S. Con. Res. 107, 217th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2016). The U.S. Congress
considered legislation that would require technological innovation in redistricting trans-
parency. See Redistricting Transparency Act of 2011, H.R. 419, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (intro-
duced in subsequent sessions as recently as January 27, 2017). The bill would, inter alia,
require states to establish a website that enables members of the public to participate in
initial development of plans. Id. § 3.
134. See, e.g., Redistricting Openness and Fairness Act, H.R. 878, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2015).
135. See H.R. HJRCA0034, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2009). The top-scored maps would then
be sent to the legislature for consideration. See id.
136. Reform proposals in Nevada and Ohio would require videoconferencing or
broadcasting of redistricting meetings/hearings. NEV. JOINT STANDING RULES, 76th Sess., at
6 (2011); OHIO CONST. art. X, § 1(C).
137. Delaware, Michigan, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee also have bills that
would require the creation of a website containing redistricting information: Delaware, S. 270,
148th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015); Michigan, S. 82, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2017); Nebraska, Legis. 653, 105th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2017); Legis. 216, 105th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Neb. 2017); Pennsylvania, Redistricting Openness and Fairness Act, H.R. 878, 2015
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(a)(1)(A) (2017).
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A. The Problem of Transparency
The ideal of transparency is deeply ingrained into the American
ethos; modern Americans are trained to believe that more transpar-
ency is always better.138 The rise of digital information has further
fueled the promise of open government. Recent initiatives emanat-
ing from all levels of government have sought to “free” usable data
in order to enhance government oversight and improve government
efficiency and accountability.139 Digital transparency advocates ar-
gue that allowing direct public access to unmediated government
data enables citizens to make better decisions, allows private en-
tities to use data to create improved public services, and promises
to revolutionize government accountability.140 The open-government
movement has made great strides toward these goals.141 But as the
open-government movement unfolds, some wonder whether open
government always delivers, arguing that in our modern informa-
tion environment too much transparency (or transparency done
poorly) can breed confusion, distort interests, and even thwart ben-
eficial government action.142
138. See BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUAN-
DARY 42 (2014) (“The philosophical and cultural commitment to open government runs deep
in American culture.”). The oft-quoted Brandeis line that “[s]unlight is ... the best of disin-
fectants” typifies this perspective. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE
BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
139. One federal example was President Obama’s Open Government Initiative, announced
in December 2009. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama for Heads of Exec. Dep’ts
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (proclaiming the President’s commitment to
making government “transparent,” “participatory,” and “collaborative” as part of his Adminis-
tration’s effort to be transparent and open); see also WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41361, THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S OPEN GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE: ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS 12-26 (2011); Paul T. Jaeger & John Carlo Bertot, Transparency and Technological
Change: Ensuring Equal and Sustained Public Access to Government Information, 27 GOV’T
INFO. Q. 371, 373 (2010). For examples of local initiatives, see S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 22D.2
(2017); E.B. Boyd, San Francisco Passes First Open Data Law, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1701410/san-francisco-passes-first-open-data-law [https://
perma.cc/J4EE-A6NB]; and Sarah Kessler, App Quest Contest Challenges Developers to Create
Apps Using NYC Data, MASHABLE (July 12, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/07/12/ mta-app-
contest/#iG5dZ6wz8Oqq [https:// perma.cc/M6CL-4PB3].
140. See John Geraci, The Four Pillars of an Open Civic System, O’REILLY RADAR (June 15,
2009), http://radar.oreilly.com/2009/06/the-four-pillars-of-an-open-ci.html [https://perma.cc/
ZW6C-9RXC].
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 39 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999)
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Bruce Cain has worried about these issues thoughtfully. He
identifies a number of problems that transparency and public
participation presents in modern deliberative democracies. A first
involves intermediary distortion. Cain notes that “average citizens
do not have the time or resources to monitor public officials ... them-
selves.”143 As a consequence, intermediaries often take on the over-
sight role. Depending on the motivations of these intermediaries,
the messages conveyed may be sensationalized or otherwise dis-
torted.144 If powerful special interests dominate discourse, trans-
parency rules may poorly serve or even undermine their function.
Second, Cain posits that modern transparency norms might en-
croach on needed deliberative space. He argues that elected repre-
sentatives must be able to exercise their judgment free of distorted
(or outsized) outside input.145 Further, Cain worries that elected of-
ficials may lack the skills or ability to sift through public inputs
during an open process ensuring that input enhances rather than
muddles the decision-making process.146 Cain also warns that put-
ting officials under a microscope will inevitably force them to find
(noting instances when too much publicity in government is problematic); see also ARCHON
FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 177-80 (2007)
(describing the real risks broad disclosure can engender and proposing principles for effective
transparency policies); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
101 (1996); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 193-94
(Jon Elster ed., 1998); Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes,
REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14, 15-16; Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW
REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2009), https://newrepublic.com/article/70097/against-transparency [https://
perma.cc/A98Q-E32B]. See generally CAIN, supra note 138, at 42.
143. CAIN, supra note 138, at 42.
144. Some motivations include maximizing readership for the press or demonstrating
impact to funders for nonprofits. See id. See generally Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Civic
Participation and the Equality Problem, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 427
(Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999) (discussing civic participation in American
politics for equal protection of interests).
145. See Bruce E. Cain, The Transparency Paradox, 11 AM. INTEREST 26, 28 (2015) (“If
interest groups ... capture the public comment and participation opportunities, it exacerbates
the problems that come with having so many veto points.”).
146. See Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the De-
cline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 852 (2014) (“In the midst of the declining
governing capacity of the American democratic order, we ought to focus less on ‘participation’
as the magical solution and more on the real dynamics of how to facilitate the organization
of effective political power.”); see also JONATHAN RAUCH, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT.
BROOKINGS, POLITICAL REALISM: HOW HACKS, MACHINES, BIG MONEY, AND BACK-ROOM DEALS
CAN STRENGTHEN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 21 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/08/political-realism-rauch2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PL9-G5NA].
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ways to conceal deliberation, entirely undermining the point and
promise of transparency.147
Relatedly, Jonathan Rauch argues that progressive calls for
greater transparency have “badly damaged the country’s gover-
nability.”148 Rauch explains: “We live in a world of second and often
third choices, and in order to govern one must make decisions and
engage in practices which look bad up close and are hard to defend
in public but which, nonetheless, seem to be the best alternative
at the time.”149
Digital transparency can amplify transparency’s downsides.
While the quantity of available government data has exploded, the
quality and utility of that information has not always improved by
similar leaps and bounds.150 Delivering open-government data is
one thing; delivering it in a format that the public can readily use
and understand, is quite another. Some argue that wholesale re-
lease of poorly contextualized government data leads to confusion—
or worse.151
A second series of problems relates to the impact of digital norms
on public participation in deliberative democracy.152 As public bodies
create platforms to enable the public to access information and
provide avenues for comment, message distortion and deluge can
undermine their ability to produce usable and productive inputs.153
147. Cain, supra note 145, at 30 (“The predictable effect of [requiring officials’ emails be
preserved for possible public release] will be that [officials] will discuss serious matters in
person or over the phone.”).
148. RAUCH, supra note 146, at 1.
149. Id. at 7.
150. Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the
United States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 91 (2012); see also Mark Fenster, The Trans-
parency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the Pursuit of a Visible State,
73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 489 (2012).
151. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 142 (arguing the dissemination of highly technical
information without converting it to a user-friendly format is ineffective and sometimes even
counterproductive); Lessig, supra note 142.
152. See Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment,
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301, 318 (2013) (discussing avenues of speech that do not facilitate
productive public discussion including: “personal attacks, profanity, ... [ ] aggressive behavior,”
or “off topic” comments that promote irrelevant services or products). Ardito also warns of
potential censorship and free speech concerns when site moderators wield a potential veto on
the speech of others. See id. at 315.
153. Cain, supra note 145, at 28 (“Since the online submission enables and encourages
more public input, agencies can be overwhelmed by the amount of public testimony directed
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To make matters worse, the growing problem of nonhuman ma-
nipulation of public forums presents a real threat.154 A growing
literature seeks to address the problem of the muddled online de-
liberative forum, suggesting that thoughtful design choices should
be employed to counter some of the problem.155
As this discussion suggests, more transparency is not always bet-
ter. And transparency—particularly digitally enhanced transpar-
ency—comes with costs. These concerns are particularly acute in the
area of redistricting.
B. The Problem of Redistricting Transparency 
In general, liberal democratic theory ascribes three goals of
government transparency: an informed citizenry, accountable gov-
ernment officials, and enhanced public trust in government.156
Redistricting transparency presents a particular set of challenges
in each respect. First, redistricting has traditionally been too arcane
and complex a topic for most Americans to grasp. It takes years of
their way.”).
154. Tim Wu, Please Prove You’re Not a Robot, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAYREVIEW (July 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/opinion/sunday/please-prove-youre-not-a-robot.html?_
r=0 [https://perma.cc/AWZ5-LUBF].
155. See Archon Fung, Minipublics: Deliberative Designs and Their Consequences, in
DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE GOVERN? 159, 162 (Shawn
W. Rosenberg ed., 2007); Warren Sack, Discourse Architecture and Very Large-Scale
Conversation, in DIGITAL FORMATIONS: IT AND NEW ARCHITECTURES IN THE GLOBAL REALM
242, 242 (Robert Latham & Saskia Sassen eds., 2005); Scott Wright, Design Matters: The
Political Efficacy of Government-Run Discussion Boards, in THE INTERNET AND POLITICS:
CITIZENS, VOTERS AND ACTIVISTS 80, 83-84 (Sarah Oates et al. eds., 2006); see also John
Morison & David R. Newman, On-line Citizenship: Consultation and Participation in New
Labour’s Britain and Beyond, 15 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 171, 185 (2001); Scott
Wright & John Street, Democracy, Deliberation and Design: The Case of Online Discussion
Forums, 9 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 849, 854-59 (2007). See generally GRAHAM SMITH, DEMOCRATIC
INNOVATIONS: DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 8-29 (2009).
156. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 888 (2006) (“By any
commonsense estimation, governmental transparency, defined broadly as a governing
institution’s openness to the gaze of others, is clearly among the pantheon of great political
virtues.” (footnote omitted)). Two of the most commonly cited goals of government trans-
parency in liberal democratic theory are to enable both an informed citizenry and official ac-
countability, central ingredients of the democratic process. See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, An
Essay on Political Tactics, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 299, 312 (John Bowring ed.,
1843); JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 89 (1862).
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study to learn the intricacies of the laws and requirements govern-
ing redistricting.157 In addition, there remain numerous unsettled
areas resulting in continuous litigation and constant change. Core
assumptions about what constitutes desirable representation mod-
els are perpetually in flux.158 These complexities make it difficult for
the public to meaningfully engage. A study published in 2013 on
public satisfaction with redistricting outcomes suggested that people
lacked enough basic knowledge about redistricting to even register
approval or disapproval of outcomes159:
157. Even people who have devoted a lifetime to the study of redistricting often find basic
presumptions or predictions proven wrong after election outcomes contradict their predictions.
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, Justice Scalia recounted what he called “[a] delicious illustration” of
experts (including judges) being proven wrong about line-drawing once elections take place.
See 541 U.S. 267, 287 n.8 (2004) (plurality opinion).
158. See Levitt, supra note 127, at 524 (“There is ample debate among scholars, activists,
and practitioners about the role in redistricting of—alone and in context—the continuity of
political representation, the nature of protection for minority rights, the degree of partisan
competition or partisan inequity, physical proximity or accessibility, and the ability and
desirability of representing homogenous or heterogeneous communities.”); see also Heather
K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1727-30
(2001) (wrestling with how to understand minority voting rights as aggregate versus indi-
vidual rights). Gerken writes, “Are the preferences of rural voters and urban voters different
and should [courts] recognize this fact? To what extent ought a majoritarian system recognize
minority voters? How does one gauge the social meaning of an apportionment plan?” Heather
K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Prog-
eny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1443 (2002).
159. Costas Panagopoulos, Public Awareness and Attitudes About Redistricting Institutions,
6 J. POL. & L. 45, 45, 47 tbl.1 (2013) (“Studies have demonstrated that, while there is consid-
erable variation in what Americans know about politics, the public is generally poorly in-
formed about the basic structures of many political institutions and processes. Citizens’
knowledge about redistricting, in particular, tends to be especially low.” (citations omitted));
see also Fougere et al., supra note 7, at 327, 340.
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Likewise (and as a consequence), holding legislators accountable
in redistricting has traditionally been difficult to achieve. Legisla-
tures typically create maps and release versions to the public,
sometimes not until late in the process.160 Whether the public can
meaningfully evaluate lines is questionable, particularly when it
comes to voters’ assessments of particular legislators’ input. Steven
Huefner points out that even when citizens have access to redistrict-
ing deliberations, maps, and criteria used to draw them, few are
able to hold legislators fully accountable for decisions made within
that process.161 Huefner explains, “[C]rucial aspects of the redistrict-
ing process occur behind closed doors, leaving voters little opportu-
nity to understand how particular redistricting choices were made
and when to blame their specific legislator for complicity in a re-
districting abuse.”162
Further complicating matters, when it comes to a complex task
like redistricting, a shadow process very often looms behind what-
ever public-facing processes take place.163 Following the 2010 round
160. This occurred, for example, in Wisconsin. See supra Part I.A.
161. Huefner, supra note 15, at 55.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-412, 2014 WL 3797315, at *20-21 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. July 10, 2014) (describing the efforts of Republican political consultants and operatives
during the 2011 Florida redistricting process who “made a mockery of the Legislature’s
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of redistricting, critics lambasted state redistricting transparency
climates, arguing that many states—even those with transparency
provisions on the books—cloaked the real process in secrecy.164
The problem of public trust is often stacked against the redistrict-
ing process. As reformers routinely point out, self-dealing is baked
in when legislators draw the lines;165 foxes guarding the henhouse
is a common refrain.166 Building public trust in outcomes is there-
fore a huge hurdle. Even in states in which commissions draw the
lines, observers have noted that public trust in their neutrality is
critical and hard to achieve given the difficulty of removing
partisanship entirely from the process not to mention the tempta-
tion for perceived losers to cry foul.167
In addition, the problem of data deluge is enormous in this
sphere. California’s experience in the 2010 round of redistricting
bears this out. California’s transparency measures won praise for
enabling meaningful public participation and building public faith
in the commission’s final maps.168 As described above, its citizen
commission built in robust transparency and public participation
mechanisms that in many ways supply a roadmap for how to open
the process. But, as Commissioner Angelo Ancheta described, “the
proclaimed transparent and open process of redistricting by [operating] ... in [a] shadow of
that process, utilizing the access it gave them to the decision makers, but going to great
lengths to conceal from the public their plan and their participation in it”), aff’d, 172 So. 3d
363 (Fla. 2015).
164. See Kusnetz, supra note 33.
165. DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO STEAL
AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY xvii-xviii (2016) (“[P]oliticians have gerrymandered since before there
was a Congress, since before gerrymandering even had a name.”).
166. But see Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 650
(2002) (arguing that factors other than partisan redistricting account for problems perceived
by those who seek reform of the redistricting process).
167. Mac Donald & Cain, supra note 130, at 614 (“The legitimacy of [the independent
redistricting commission] approach hinges on all parties buying into the belief that legal and
professional norms of impartiality will ultimately prevail. In practice, the losers in judicially
imposed redistricting plans often read bias into the final outcomes.”); see also Kang, supra
note 74, at 684 (noting that “[s]cholars have discovered that even truly independent methods
of redistricting may produce quite biased results,” suggesting that the public has reason for
skepticism).
168. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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Commission became overloaded with information.”169 Ancheta
continued,
Although the commissioners, the Commission’s staff, and its
line-drawing team created efficient processes and employed up-
to-date redistricting technologies and software, no one expected
that there would be testimony from over 2700 members of the
public and over 20,000 written submissions, including fully
developed statewide and regional maps. There were methods for
streamlining the information, and the line-drawing team care-
fully catalogued the data. Much of the testimony was also
repetitive—having been the product of mobilization efforts by
various groups and offices—but it was all counted.
[T]he Commission was ill-equipped to deal with what evolved
into a redistricting “big data” problem.... Sorting through the
data and separating the signal from the noise became challeng-
ing because of the sheer volume of testimony, and converting
imprecise and sometimes conflicting proposals into geospatial
information became problematic.170
California’s experience offers a cautionary tale for what could unfold
in the rest of the country as states, individuals, and private organi-
zations make redistricting data and mapping tools widely available.
As the public becomes increasingly aware of the ills of redistricting
and more interested in overseeing it, state redistricting entities are
likely to face increased public pressure for greater levels of public
access to the process. Depending on what transparency measures
are in place, line-drawers could face a California-like deluge of pub-
lic input to the point it hinders rather than helps meet transpar-
ency’s core goals. As Karen Mac Donald and Bruce Cain warn,
[P]ublic testimony can easily overwhelm the redistricting
process and sometimes provides conflicting interpretations. A
sincere and earnest effort to determine the public’s interests in
redistricting requires finding ways to process large amounts of
information rapidly, examining the feasibility of competing
169. Ancheta, supra note 128, at 130.
170. Id.
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proposals, and managing public expectations about the ability to
satisfy everyone’s demands.171
Furthermore, managing “big data” projects is a tricky endeavor in
which state employees are seldom trained. If redistricting data is
not made available or is made available in unusable formats or
without sufficient educational tools and context, the effort could
backfire, feeding public anger and distrust of the process.
Likewise, the intermediary problem has huge potential to distort
state redistricting conversations.172 Certain groups are likely to be
very active in redistricting advocacy.173 Is it likely that those groups
will inadequately represent the interests of all? Will some advocates
and organizations have outsized influence? Will deeper pockets
magnify some voices? Is it possible that well-organized groups will
game the system or use trickery to introduce public comments and
maps? The answer to each of these questions—as already demon-
strated in past rounds—is a certain yes.174
An additional challenge is the problem of ensuring adequate
deliberative space.175 Overzealous transparency rules may force
decision makers underground. As plaintiffs in Pennsylvania and
Florida complained during the last round, stringent transparency
requirements led line-drawers to conduct the “real” business in the
backroom undermining transparency rules designed to prevent this
very behavior.176
Additionally, the growing concern of data security adds another
troubling twist. Is it possible that outside (or inside) forces seeking
to destabilize American democracy will take advantage of trans-
parency and public participation measures to flood input channels?
171. Mac Donald & Cain, supra note 130, at 611.
172. See id. at 616 (citing Kevin M. Leyden, Interest Group Testimony and Resources at
Congressional Hearings, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 431, 435-37 (1995)). 
173. CAIN, supra note 138, at 83 (noting the problem of staffing the California Citizens
Redistricting Commission with attorneys that did not appear biased, Cain writes, “The great-
er the political consequences, the more likely that the expertise will also be partisan affil-
iated”).
174. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
175. Deliberative space in redistricting is widely acknowledged as an important component
of the process. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 131, at 1092 (noting that it is wholly appropriate
for a redistricting body receiving legal advice to do so in closed session).
176. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Will state governments take sufficient care to ensure redistricting
websites and data repositories are secure and that hackers or other
disruptors cannot infiltrate and alter data they contain? This coun-
try—both in the public and private sectors—is just starting to come
to grips with the massive vulnerabilities within the information so-
ciety we have built. Attacks on our election infrastructure suggest
that data security concerns will add to the complicated question of
transparency in redistricting.177
And finally, one of the biggest hurdles in redistricting transpar-
ency is a philosophical one. Does transparency unquestionably ben-
efit the line-drawing process? California experimented with a full
disclosure model, going to great lengths to make the process as
transparent and open to public input as possible—even going so far
as populating its commission with citizens themselves.178 At the
other end of the spectrum is Wisconsin where legislators during the
2010 cycle took pains to shield the process from public input (and
from political opponents).179 But from a good government perspec-
tive, is one end of the spectrum inherently “bad” while the other
“good”? Is it possible that a closed process, or one with very limited
transparency mechanisms, might produce superior maps that are
more representative of voters’ interests? Maybe shutting out public
noise is preferable, assuming that the criteria upon which line-
drawers base their decisions are impartial and apolitical.180 If maps
produced under a closed process are met with criticism, the ready
177. See Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, J. DEMOCRACY, April
2017, at 70, 71-72 (describing the impact of disinformation campaigns on democratic in-
stitutions); Kaveh Waddell, Why Elections Are Now Classified as ‘Critical Infrastructure,’
ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/why-the-
government-classified-elections-as-critical-infrastructure/513122/ [https://perma.cc/EL4E-
QXFL] (describing threats to U.S. election security). 
178. Michael Kang’s proposal to require new redistricting plans to win statewide popular
approval through direct democracy also populates this end of the spectrum. See Kang, supra
note 74, at 700.
179. See supra Part I.A.
180. The problem, however, is that the goal of neutral criteria prompting line-drawers to
spit out competitive maps is likely an impossible dream for the same reason experts doubt
computers are unable to do so. See Kang, supra note 74, at 685 (“Once we have neutral,
apolitical decisionmakers handling redistricting, how should they draw district lines? The
answers are not obvious in any sense. Should electoral competition be paramount, as many
suggest? Should partisan and group representation in the legislature be more important?”).
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answer in states in which legislators draw the lines is to vote the
line-drawers out of office.
The problem with this line of thinking is the process failure
problem. Voters cannot easily hold legislators accountable if the
process or resulting maps displease because, in many cases, un-
happy voters have been districted out of the bad actor’s district or
subsumed in districts dominated by supporters.181 Likewise, as de-
scribed above, holding individual legislators accountable in the
redistricting process is next to impossible; maps are the result of
hundreds of thousands of decisions.182 By far the biggest reason
why the Wisconsin end of the spectrum is untenable is the issue of
public trust. It may be that some measure of deliberative space is
required to enable line-drawers to do their work. But public skep-
ticism of redistricting is on the rise. In this environment, the black
box approach is perilous if the end result is to survive public—and
judicial—scrutiny.
With these concerns in mind, the next Part suggests some basic
principles to help guide states through these fraught waters.
III. REDISTRICTING TRANSPARENCY IN 2020: BEST PRACTICES
Which transparency measures have the best chance of producing
an informed citizenry, accountable officials, and public trust in the
process? Is it possible to design transparency rules that line-drawers
and outside malefactors cannot manipulate or subvert? There are no
easy answers to these questions. This Part suggests four basic prin-
ciples to guide states in designing redistricting transparency rules
for the upcoming round.
A. Clarify
States should work to clarify redistricting transparency rules.
Well in advance of the next round (meaning now), states should
181. Id. at 698 (“An elected official or political party hurts its chances of re-election if it
takes an unpopular position on tax cuts. An elected official or political party that entrenches
itself through redistricting, on the other hand, increases its chances of re-election regardless
whether the redistricting is popular with the public.”).
182. See Huefner, supra note 15, at 55.
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conduct an audit of transparency measures used in past rounds
whether mandated by statute, legislative rule, judicial decree, or
undertaken in practice. States should evaluate the effectiveness of
their rules and look to the experiences of other states for ideas about
what might work better. Once this audit is complete, legislators
should work to clarify and formalize the transparency mechanisms
built into the redistricting process. State legislatures should affir-
matively clarify whether open records and open meetings laws apply
to the redistricting process (and subprocesses) and the extent to
which legislative privilege shields legislative activity.
Evaluating, formalizing, and clarifying transparency rules and
processes can produce a number of desired effects, most importantly
improving public confidence in the process. A lack of clarity or mis-
representation of the level of access afforded can breed mistrust
and undermine public confidence in outcomes.183 Additionally, a
lack of clear rules and procedures can lead to costly litigation to
establish what level of access should be (or should have been)
afforded. Importantly, legislatures will have better luck building
deliberative space into the process if transparency rules and
procedures are clear at the outset to counter the public perception
that something tricky or underhanded is taking place.
B. Consider Timing Carefully
States devising redistricting transparency rules must consider
their timing carefully. Line-drawers commonly delay transparency
to purposely truncate the public’s ability to oversee and weigh in
during the process. Wisconsin’s legislative tactics during the latest
round are a poster child for this approach. After a secretive process,
legislators published maps followed by only one public meeting and
183. Jennifer Shkabatur, Cities @ Crossroads: Digital Technology and Local Democracy in
America, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1438 (2011) (“Public officials and designers of participatory
platforms should be explicit about the procedures ex-ante and adhere to them ex-post. Even
if the rules grant participants only the most minimal powers, a misrepresentation of the
process can deepen the levels of mistrust between citizens and government and alienate
potential participants from future participatory endeavors.”).
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a party-line vote a mere ten days later.184 Another example de-
scribed above is Illinois, which held public hearings before redis-
tricting maps were released and then hastily passed them without
meaningful opportunity for public comment.185 And in another ex-
ample, although Tennessee legislators boasted that they planned
“the most open, interactive and transparent redistricting process,”
legislators did not release information about the plans “until ...
about a week before they adopted the proposals,” and did not release
full district maps until two weeks after the legislature had approved
them.186 Providing notice and adequate time to evaluate should be
a cornerstone of any redistricting transparency plan.187
In 2009, the League of Women Voters and the Campaign Legal
Center produced “Model Legislation for Transparency in the Re-
districting Process.”188 The model legislation featured a variety of
specific timing mandates that provide decision points states should
consider, including, for example, establishing deadlines for how long
before the publication of U.S. census data the state’s redistricting
website should be up and functioning, when the criteria line-
drawers will use will be publicized, how long before adopting final
plans a set of detailed proposed plans should be circulated online
and in print, and how long after public comments are received
should the final plans be posted publicly online.189
184. See Michael Buelow, August: Redistricting Should Be More Transparent, WIS.
FREEDOM INFO. COUNCIL, http://www.wisfoic.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=206:august-redistricting-should-be-more-transparent&catid=56:2011-columns&Itemid
=55 [https://perma.cc/BYS7-89PP]. North Carolina, with its storied redistricting malfeasance,
is still using this tactic today. See Anne Blythe, Here’s Your Chance to Comment on Shape of
Maps to Correct NC Gerrymanders, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 3, 2017, 6:53 PM), http://news
observer.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article165323017.html [https://perma.cc/
XE87-24Q4] (describing how legislative line-drawers in North Carolina are citing a tight
schedule in order to limit public input).
185. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
186. See Kusnetz, supra note 33.
187. Kentucky, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Wisconsin received a score of 0/100 on the
criteria of whether schedules of redistricting meetings/hearings were available to the public
in the Center for Public Integrity analysis of state redistricting transparency in the 2010
round. See Ginley, supra note 132.
188. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS & CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., DEVELOPING AN ACTION
AGENDA FOR REDISTRICTING IN 2011, at 20-25 (2009).
189. Id. The proposed Federal Redistricting Transparency Act also included specific timing
deadlines. For the version introduced in 2017, see Redistricting Transparency Act of 2017,
H.R. 713, 115th Cong. (2017).
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States can cater timing decisions to their liking but should work
to produce and publicize well in advance of the cycle a clear timeline
that provides adequate notice and opportunity for meaningful pub-
lic input and oversight.
C. Embrace Technology
We are past the point of no return to the days when line-drawers
could hide behind highly rarified technical barriers to explain away
an opaque process. If states fail to create open-redistricting plat-
forms themselves, nonprofits and other actors will provide public
tools to draw alternative maps—indeed, such platforms already
exist.190 States that have not already done so should get out in front
of the tidal wave of open redistricting. Done right, platforms that
educate, inform, and enable members of the public to participate can
go a long way in building public trust in the process and out-
comes.191
Open redistricting presents many challenges. Relatively early on,
the open-government movement produced consensus about the core
features of an ideal platform. Written in 2007 and later updated, the
“Ten Principles for Opening Up Government Information” provide
useful guidance. They include: completeness, primacy (use of pri-
mary source data), timeliness, ease of physical and electronic access,
machine readability, nondiscrimination, use of commonly owned
standards, removal of licensing/attribution requirements, perma-
nence, and elimination of usage costs.192 States developing digital
190. See Bradlee, supra note 121.
191. Despite the troubles Florida’s transparency regime experienced during the 2010
round, the State created a comprehensive redistricting website offering redistricting software
to allow members of the public to try their hand at creating maps. The site included written
video tutorials on creating and submitting plans, archives of videos and transcripts of
meetings, open data and code for its district building software, and links to resources. See
Learn to Use MyDistrictBuilder, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES’ REDISTRICTING COMMITTEE
& FLORIDAREDISTRICTING, https://mydistrictbuilder.wordpress.com/learnmydistrictbuilder/
[https://perma.cc/966W-J9Y8].
192. A group of open government advocates developed the document in 2007, which the
Sunlight Foundation later updated. See Ten Principles for Opening up Government Infor-
mation, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Aug. 11, 2010), https://sunlightfoundation.com/policy/documents/
ten-open-data-principles/ [https://perma.cc/H3MP-SDC6].
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platforms for redistricting would be wise to consider each of these
elements carefully.
In 2010, the Brookings Institution convened members of the aca-
demic, nonprofit, and legislative communities to determine a series
of best practices for transparency in redistricting. The group focused
its attention on necessary preconditions for members of the public
to evaluate proposed plans and create alternative plans of their
own.193 Several recommendations related to ways technology should
be incorporated into transparency mechanisms.194 For example, the
group suggested states create platforms populated with sufficient
data and software tools to enable “the public [to] verify, reproduce,
and evaluate ... plan[s].”195 The group further suggested that such
software “be publicly available, ... open-source[d],” and include “doc-
umentation sufficient for the public to replicate the results using in-
dependent software.”196 The Brookings principles suggest concrete
ways technology can be leveraged to improve redistricting trans-
parency.
Also issued prior to the 2010 round, the Campaign Legal Center’s
model transparency legislation makes very specific recommenda-
tions that feature technology measures prominently. The first sub-
stantive provision mandates making redistricting data available,
which would require redistricting entities to establish a compre-
hensive website prior to the release of census data; then, within
fourteen days after the release of the data, the website would have
precinct-level data, census-tract-level data, interactive software en-
abling users to design state legislative and U.S. congressional dis-
tricts, and information and tutorials.197 The model legislation also
imposes a duty on redistricting entities to update the site continu-
ously.198
As the model legislation recognizes, state redistricting websites
are a crucial feature of redistricting transparency that every state
193. See Micah Altman et al., Principles for Transparency and Public Participation in
Redistricting, BROOKINGS (June 17, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/principles-for-
transparency-and-public-participation-in-redistricting/ [https://perma.cc/43T6-FZJG].
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. LEAGUE OF WOMENS VOTERS & CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., supra note 188, at 20-21.
198. Id. at 21.
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should maintain.199 Many states have already built impressive
sites.200 Building on the recommendations noted above, state redis-
tricting websites should include data repositories including merged
U.S. census and election data (where possible) and available state
data on political boundaries; open-redistricting tools incorporating
relevant data and including easy-to-use mapping software and ac-
companying instructions/tutorials; hearing portals that include no-
tice of hearings, live-streamed hearings, and hearing archives;
posted plans—both those created by legislative/commission line-
drawers and maps submitted by members of the public; and portals
for public input and comment. Critically, because of the complexity
of redistricting, sites should ideally include comprehensive educa-
tional materials and links to assist members of the public in un-
derstanding legal constraints in the redistricting process, including
federal and state laws, constitutional commands, and plain lan-
guage overviews of relevant case law.201 The more states (and other
civic institutions) can educate the public about the need for trade-
offs in the redistricting process, the more nuanced and productive
the redistricting conversation is likely to be.202
199. According to the Center for Public Integrity analysis of the 2010 redistricting round,
only two states received a 0/100 on the criteria of whether the state made an online
redistricting resource available (Maine and North Dakota received a score of 0/100). Thirty
states received a score of 100/100 on this measure (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connect-
icut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming). See Ginley, supra note 132.
200. For examples of strong state redistricting websites not already mentioned, see Alaska,
ALASKA REDISTRICTING BOARD [https://perma.cc/TN7L-5337]; Arkansas, ARK. BOARD AP-
PORTIONMENT, http://www.arkansasredistricting.org [https://perma.cc/BJL5-4NWA]; Colora-
do, Redistricting in Colorado, COLO., https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cga-redistrict [https://
perma.cc/2BTT-PQCS]; Montana, Districting and Apportionment Commission Meeting Mate-
rials, MONT. LEGISLATURE, http://leg.mt.gov/css/Committees/Interim/2011-2012/Districting/
Meeting-Documents/meetings.asp [https://perma.cc/RJC4-BAL3]; and Pennsylvania, PA. RE-
DISTRICTING, http://www.redistricting.state.pa.us [https://perma.cc/M27H-DGYF].
201. Assuming it is possible to render redistricting decisions in plain language.
202. This task should not be limited to state redistricting entities only. Schools and uni-
versities, nonprofits, and other good government organizations have an important role to play
in educating the public on the basics of redistricting. Colleges and law schools can and should
focus efforts on training students by offering redistricting courses to teach students the law
and mechanics of the process. To this end, William & Mary Law School’s Election Law Pro-
gram teamed up with the College of William & Mary’s Center for Geospatial Analysis to offer
a course, offered in the fall semester in 2017, called “Introduction to Legislative Redistricting.”
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D. Fear Technology
States should carefully think through technology’s downsides and
establish ways to stem its negative impacts. Online portals are as
easily manipulated as in-person public redistricting hearings. As we
saw in Florida in the 2010 cycle, when political operatives employed
stand-ins at public meetings to artificially multiply voices in favor
of their desired lines, the specter of trickery is most certainly
multiplied in online spaces.203 Outside the redistricting context, the
threat of bots disrupting democratic processes is a fearful reality.204
What are potential fixes to prevent such harms in the redistrict-
ing process? One solution would be to carefully manage inputs.205
Perhaps states could establish rules for individuals and organiza-
tions that limit the number of times comments and/or alternative
maps may be submitted, including penalties for violating repeat
player rules. Another, more cumbersome, idea would be to require
those who submit alternative maps for consideration to do so
through a legislative sponsor or to secure a requisite number of sig-
natures of residents of the state in support in exchange for a com-
mitment from line-drawers to consider and deliberate features of
submitted maps.
Finally, states should be clear-eyed about the near certainty that
hackers or others might seek to destabilize the process and take
affirmative steps to prevent such interference. States should develop
strong security measures using encryption tools, and moderate
platforms to ensure wrongdoers are expelled and/or excluded. States
should consider authentication processes for those who submit
maps or public comments to establish their human form, identity,
and state residency. Submissions could be anonymized on the
public-facing portal if desired and still include protections to limit
The course offered an introduction to Geographic Information Systems (GIS) skills and tools
designed to develop compliant maps. In the course, students learned to work with district
boundary maps, census information, and other socioeconomic layers in an integrated GIS plat-
form to understand and quantify the impacts realized when voting districts are redrawn. See
Election Law Courses at William & Mary, WM. & MARY L. SCH., http://law.wm.edu/academics/
intellectuallife/researchcenters/electionlaw/courses/index.php [https://perma.cc/3XFV-CPCG].
203. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 376-77 (Fla. 2015).
204. See Wu, supra note 154.
205. See Cain, supra note 145; Bruce E. Cain, Commentary, Yes, American Government Is
Too Open, 29 GOVERNANCE 295, 295-97 (2016).
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malfeasance. In addition, states should publicize state and federal
criminal penalties for tampering with government databases to dis-
incentivize would-be bad actors and punish wrongdoers.206 Efforts
to prevent transgressions must of course be carefully crafted to limit
a chill on participation—a challenge that many online public plat-
forms face.
CONCLUSION
Members of the public and reviewing courts are skeptical when
transparency measures prove hollow. To avoid negative assessments
of their maps, states should ensure that transparency measures are
not lip service. Those charged with designing and implementing
transparency mechanisms should be able to demonstrate that public
input is meaningfully gathered and considered. Clarifying transpar-
ency rules, considering timing carefully, and deploying technology
thoughtfully will help in this regard. Taking pains to take transpar-
ency seriously will pay off by increasing public confidence in the
process and taking an important arrow out of the quiver of those
who might attack resulting maps.
Redistricting transparency is no panacea for addressing struc-
tural infirmities inherent in the line-drawing process. That said,
clear and thoughtful transparency rules are necessary to address
increasingly precarious public confidence in the process. Regardless
of whether legislators or commissions draw the lines, getting trans-
parency right in the 2020 round is crucial. States should approach
transparency planning with a healthy dose of skepticism. Hollow
206. See, e.g., Computer Fraud & Abuse Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). The CFAA
and its state counterparts are typically interpreted broadly. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s
Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1596, 1616-17, 1624-40 (2003) (explaining how courts have expansively interpreted the
concepts of “access” and “authorization” under CFAA to capture undesirable behavior).
Election statutes that reference hacking or computer malfeasance address voting machines
and state voter registration databases. Most state election codes incorporate broad statutes
that make it illegal to tamper with voting in any way. For instance, Florida’s law makes it a
felony “to perpetrate or aid in the perpetration of any fraud in connection with any vote cast,
to be cast, or attempted to be cast.” FLA. STAT. § 104.041 (2017). There is an argument that
this broad rule could apply to redistricting websites if interpreted to be “in connection” with
votes cast. Because this may be a stretch, states should consider extending such protections
to redistricting data and websites.
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transparency policies can backfire. Courts reviewing lines will, as
they have in the past, weigh transparency shortcomings against
line-drawers and the maps they create. Transparency measures can
backfire in other ways, too, through distortion and information
deluge. These and other ills are primed to cause trouble unless
thoughtfully counterbalanced. And now that data security concerns
have crashed into the election world, states must think through how
to keep disinformation and destabilization clear of the redistricting
realm.
States should assume a redistricting oversight tsunami is coming
in 2020. Tackling these problems head on is the wisest course.
